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Dear Mr. Serageldin, 
I have the pleasure of transmitting to you the report of the CGIAR Panel on Proprie&y 
Science and Technology that was chaired by Mr. Timothy Roberts of the UK. The report, as well 
as comments solicited by TAC ‘from a number of outside experts, were considered by the 
Committee at its 74th meeting in Hyderabad in March 1998. The Panel Chair was present at the 
meeting as was one of the Panel members. TAC subsequently prepared a commentary on the 
report which is attached to this letter. 
Discussion of this report will complete one phase of the process initiated at MTM’97 
when the Group requested the appointment of this Panel under the auspices of TAC. Panel 
membership was decided after extensive consultation with the Members of the Group and 
combined a remarkable range of relevant experience. 
The Panel started its work in September 1997, engaged initially in an electronic exchange 
on the issues to be addressed, consulted with Members of the CGIAR community and other 
stakeholders, held two meetings, and conducted surveys, one of centres utilizing intellectual 
property. TAC considers that the Panel’s report significantly advances understanding of the 
issues confronting the CGIAR with respect to intellectual property protection. The Committee 
recognizes that the Panel’s terms of reference were difficult to satisfy, given the wide diversity of 
views on the issues by different stakeholder groups and the uncertainty of the legal environment. 
Nevertheless, TAC is pleased with the progress that has been made. 
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In its commentary, TAC first reaffirms specific areas of agreement, expands on some 
points made by the Panel, and then supplements aspects of the Panel’s recommendations. 
TAC joins the Panel in favouring the arguments for acquiring protection inthree situatio~ns: 
access, partnerships, and technology transfer. TAC also agrees that centre research and 
development should not be undertaken explicitly for the purpose of generating intellectual 
property for trade or for revenue. The Committee believes that CGIAR policy should promote 
an assessment of patenting and other forms of protection while assuring that advantages and 
disadvantages are accounted for. 
One implication of the recommendations of the report lies in the consequences fckr the 
CGIAR’s focus on international public goods. Public goods are, among other things, non- 
proprietary and non-rivalrous. Biotechnology is opening up new possibilities and new 
opportunities to make proprietary claims, in effect thereby permitting the removal of some 
products from the public goods portfolio. The very pursuit of intellectual property protection 
by the CGIAR testifies to the non-public goods nature of the products for whkh such rights 
are being pursued. Even so, to the extent that the CGIAR intends to use property rights I:O 
maintain the products in the public domain, the products retain some of the characteristics of 
non-proprietary goods. 
We believe that the attached report and TAC’s commentary will allow for a 
stimulating discussion at MTM’98 and provide the Group with the information necessary to 
make appropriate policy decisions. The issues involved are difficult and often extremely 
sensitive. The CGIAR must address these urgently if it is to make further progress in 
reaching its goals of sustainable food security. 
Sincerely yours, 
Donald L. Winkelmann 
TAC Chair, 
TAC COkMENTARY ON THE REPORT OF THE CGIAR PAN&L ON 
PROPRIETARY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
TAC is grateful to Timothy Roberts, Panel Chair, and to members of the Panel that 
prepared the report on the future role of the CGIAR in proprietary science and technology. 
The Committee particularly appreciates the wealth of synthesized information on the 
protection of intellectual property (IP) as it relates to the CGIAR and the broad spectrum of 
opinions reflected in the report. The report significantly advances our understanding of the 
issues confronting the CGIAR with respect to intellectual property rights (IPR). 
TAC recognizes that the Panel’s Terms of Reference were difficult to satisfy, given 
the diversity of views on the issues and the uncertainty of the legal environment. Against that 
background, TAC supports the recommendations made, but wishes that the Panel had 
reviewed more fully the advantages and disadvantages of various policy options. 
In what follows, TAC first reaffirms specific areas of agreement, expands on some 
points made by the Panel, and then supplements aspects of the Panel’s recommendations. 
Reaffirming Panel Observations 
The Panel made several observations aimed at setting a context for their 
recommendations: 
IPR will have an ever-stronger influence on the CGIAR’s access to the IP of others (see 
below: Expanding on Panel Observations). 
IPR can be significant in managing the IP developed by the centers (both improved 
germplasm and enabling technologies) and in supporting center commitments for genetic 
resources held in trust (see Expanding...). 
The CGIAR must attend closely the evolution of international agreements on genetic 
resources, e.g., the obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and 
the International Undertaking for Plant Genetic Resources. 
In the future, other rights, which the Panel has called alternative rights regimes (e.g., 
farmers’ rights and national sovereignty) may become dominant considerations for some 
classes of genetic resources. 
To manage effectively the three broad groups of material of concern to the CGIAR (that in 
trust; IP belonging to others, and IP developed by the centers) access to relevant legal and 
negotiating counsel is essential. (see below: Supplementing the Recommendations). 
CGIAR centers are now using biotechnology-based IP belonging to others (see 
Supplementing...). 
The CGIAR has an interim working document “Guiding Principles for CGIAR Centers on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources” which orients current work (see 
Supplementing...). 
. . . 
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Expanding on Panel Observations 
The Panel was charged to deal with proprietary science; it concentrated its attention on 
patents and plant variety protection. TAC accepts the idea that the CGIAR must be concerned 
with genetic resources held in trust, the IP developed by others, and the IP-developed by the 
centers; and that some situations will favor the application of legal rights to IP developed by 
centers. The Panel set out criteria which could guide the CGIAR in deciding about protecting 
intellectual property emerging from its work. These suggest several situations in which such 
protection might be conducive to attaining CGIAR goals: 
l to assure ready access to the IP by others, 
l to support public and private partnerships, 
l to facilitate commercialization, utilization and technology transfer, 
l to assure that center-developed IP might be traded for the protected IP of others, 
and 
0 to generate revenue 
With respect to IP emerging from the work of the CGIAR, and where publishing is not 
thought to offer adequate protection, TAC joins the Panel in favoring the arguments for 
acquiring protection in three situations: access, partnerships, and technology transfer. TAC 
notes that establishing protection through patents is costly and that protecting rights claimed 
can entail heavy costs. TAC went on to consider arguments against claiming IPR for 
tradeables and for revenues. Three concerns were prominent. One was that lencouragement in 
those areas might lead to the diversion of effort from the System’s primary goals with 
relatively low probabilities of success (to judge by the success rates of others). The second 
was that such pursuits might threaten working relationships with primary partners in the 
south. The third was that the economic surpluses on which revenues would be based might 
better be transferred to producers and consumers than to the CGIAR. 
TAC’s conclusion, like that of the Panel, is that center research and development 
should not be undertaken explicitly for the purpose of generating IP for trade or for revenue. 
Even so, and recognizing that such circumstances will be exceptional, center research aimed 
explicitly at CGIAR goals might lead to IP that could be traded or could generate income, 
were it protected. In such cases, and where publishing does not offer adequate protection, 
TAC believes CGIAR policy should permit an assessment of patenting while: assuring that 
advantages and disadvantages (e.g., see above) are accounted for. 
Like the Panel, TAC did not discuss in detail the arguments some make about ethical 
issues, following the Group’s MTM97 suggestion to look to the fmdings of the Genetic 
Resources Policy Committee (GRPC). TAC did, however, note that, for the ,CGIAR, the 
ethics of the case for IPR are rooted in the CGIAR’s people-centered strategiles for poverty 
alleviation. TAC notes that biosafety, another theme of abiding concern in the biotechnology 
arena, is treated in its commentary on the findings of the General Biotechnology Panel. 
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Supplementing Panel Recommendations 
TAC supports much of the first recommendation, especially the need to base policy on 
the goals of the CGIAR. TAC believes that the recommendation should be expanded to 
include: 
1. more emphasis on the need to take into account commitments made by the CGIAR 
to duties that will emerge from the implementation of international agreements, 
e.g., CBD, dealing with genetic resources; 
2. more emphasis on the need for all decisions about protection for CGIAR- 
developed IP to be made on a case-by-case basis; 
3. the possibility to decide about protection for IP developed in direct pursuit of 
CGIAR goals but seen to further CGIAR goals if used to trade for the protected IP 
of others or for revenue. 
In the case where revenues ensue from CGIAR IP, TAC’s view is that such revenues (net of 
the costs centers incur in obtaining protection) should be assigned to a freestanding agency, 
e.g., a foundation, whose objective would be to ensure that obligations emerging from . 
international agreements are met and to support research consistent with CGIAR goals. 
In deciding about protection for center-developed IP: 
1. Decisions should be decentralized to centers. 
2. Center decision-making should be strongly supported by expert legal and 
negotiating counsel, especially that provided by a centralized service (see below), 
in addition to whatever expertise centers access directly. 
3. For all such decisions, the underlying logic should be made transparent. 
TAC supports the Panel’s second recommendation, notes the urgency of the matter, 
and notes that the experience gained from reviewing and normalizing present CGIAR use of 
the IP of others will help the CGIAR to assess its future options and policies. TAC favors 
more emphasis on the management of legal and negotiating expertise for dealing with others 
whose IP is of interest to the CGIAR, for the IP emerging from the CGIAR efforts, and/or for 
materials in trust. 
With respect to the third recommendation, TAC agrees with the points made there. 
Moreover, TAC notes the tentative tone of the present “Guiding Principles...” and wonders if 
events during the years since its first drafting do not favor a more positive view about the role 
of IP and a more neutral view about IPR as the CGIAR pursues its goals. The CGIAR will 
carry out its mandate in a world in which proprietary claims are evolving rapidly; to perform 
effectively for the poor will require great sensitivity to the issues and opportunities emerging 
from intellectual property. 
X 
Beyond this, given its .understanding about the concerns of others, TAC recommends a 
review of circumstances under which the use of material transfer agreements (as required by 
the agreements with FAO about genetic resources held in trust) will ensure that access to the 
original genetic resources (as distinct from products derived from those materials, e.g., 
improved varieties or isolated and assayed genes) held in trust can be maintained in the public 
domain and readily available to all. TAC recognizes that cross-cutting concerns will emerge 
as international treaties incorporating national sovereignty and farmers’ righlts are 
implemented (e.g., CBD), and that CGIAR policy must be reviewed in the light of such 
concerns. 
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EXEdUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
Increasingly knowledge, and its application, is becoming proprietary. ‘This impacts on all 
research and development. The CGIAR has always aimed to produce-international public 
goods, available freely for all to use. How should the system respond to these changes in the 
management and application of knowledge? 
Proprietary rights, in agricultural biotechnology and equally in germplasm are being claimed 
by both private firms and public institutions. They include patent rights; plant variety rights; 
and contractual rights arising from material transfer agreements (MIAs). There are also other 
rights, as yet not so clearly defined as intellectual property: obligations imposed (or to be 
imposed) by the CBD; Farmers’ Rights; and traditional resource rights. We term these 
“alternative rights regimes”. 
Our Panel, to advise on these matters, was deliberately constituted with a range of expertise 
and viewpoints. Because our views differ strongly, we can neither endorse the current systems 
of rights nor oppose them. The same goes for biotechnology: generally, or in specific 
applications. But we have been able to agree on some practical steps that the Centres should 
now take. 
The Panel’s Work 
Our mandate assumes that Centres may want to use at least some proprietary technology. To 
find out more, we made some brief surveys 
0 To what extent are CGIAR mandated crops already affected by proprietary 
claims? We surveyed the broad pattern of trade in harvested crops between 
developed and developing countries. 
l What are Centres doing already ? We polled seven of the Centres about their 
’ detailed use of proprietary science. 
l Will owners make their proprietary science available? We asked some owners 
of proprietary agricultural biotechnology (private companies and universities) 
about their willingness to license their technology to the CGIAR and its clients. 
Proprietary Science of Others 
We are concerned by the results of our poll of Centres. In nearly half the cases in which the 
Centres were using proprietary biotechnology, they were uncertain whether the results of their 
research could be applied freely (or at all). In such cases, the process or product used was 
believed covered by a patent, in at least some counties: or material (germplasm or vectors) 
used had been obtained under an MTA for research use only. Use by the Centres’ clients of the 
results of such research may only be possible with the permission of the owners of the 
technology, in such countries and under such conditions as they allow. Without such 
permission, the Centres, or their clients, may be sued. 
These cases need professional investigation, to check if there is a problem and to help 
resolve it. ‘Even if their own actions are lawful, Centres cannot release material which may be 
subject to constraints on use without, as a minimum, warning recipients fully of possible 
problems. Also, lack of experience in IP hinders the Centres in obtaining access to proprietary 
technology. Centres must have access to skilled professional advice on intellectual property: 
Xiv 
we re&ommend setting up a central function to offer this service. This will be a significant 
expense. 
Access to Proprietary Science 
Will owners of intellectual property be prepared to make it available for the use of the poor? 
In our very limited survey, they said they would. We cannot take this encouraging response at 
face value. Owners will hardly act against their own interests. However, some factors give 
hope. There are reasons why owners may benefit from licensing their technology, even at no 
cost (demonstration of the technology, creation of demand, provoking introduction of 
regulations, development of partnerships). Owners will not license, however, where losing 
control of the technology damages them, technically or financially. Ability to segment markets 
is crucial. The CGIAR cannot hope to acquire rights to technology for use on behalf of the 
poor, if the resulting products then compete in commercial markets, forcing prices down. 
Proprietary Science of Centres 
The Agreements between FAO and the CGIAR oblige Centres to exclude intellectual property 
protection over “in trust” germplasm, so no question arises about this. However, 
developments may, and sometimes should, be protected. The overriding principle here is that 
such protection should only be applied for if it furthers the mission of the CGIAIX, and 
subject to the proviso that such developments must be accessible, and if possible delivered, to 
the poor. 
Subject to this overriding requirement, there are several situations in which protection might be 
appropriate. We discuss these. We do not believe that generating income should ever be the 
main reason for seeking protection. Some of us believe that it will sometimes be appropriate 
to protect bargaining chips’. 
After discussiig the appropriate IP polic$ for Centres, we reviewed the existing policy. Most 
of us find it broadly in line with our conclusions, though with some differences in emphasis, 
Organisation 
We suggest how the CGIAR centres should organise themselves to receive intellectual 
property advice from a central P function. The long-term aim will be to develop 
complementary expertise in individual Centres. The central function must report at a high 
level, to give it support for implementing difEcult decisions. 
Implications 
We have not been able to reach consensus about implications of our findings. We list some 
options. Some think that the CGIAR system should seek to influence policy at world level. In 
TRIPS and the CBD the needs of poverty alleviation, food production, food security, and the 
conservation of agricultural biodiversity may not get the emphasis they deserve. The CGIAR 
should be a voice for agriculture, and a voice for the poor. Others doubt whether the CGIAR 
can reach persuasive conclusions on policies to be followed, and are concerned that such 
intervention may damage the CGIAR’s ability to give the poor technical help. 
xv 
REC6MMENDATIONS 
1. In dealing with proprietary science, the CGIAR must be guided by its mission. How it 
advances the mission will determine the need for: 
0 Access to the proprietary science of others; 
l Protection of the CGIAR’s developments; 
0 Preventing misappropriation by others of CGIAR material held in trust; 
0 Selection and design of research programs. 
Above all, research and development should never be undertaken as part of a strategy to, or 
simply in the hope that it will, generate either cash to support CGIAR work, or bargaining 
chips for acquiring rights to technology from others. On protection, Panel members are 
divided: some would never approve seeking protection primarily to produce bargaining chips, 
while others would find it appropriate in certain situations. 
2. The CGIAR must promptly acquire relevant expertise to enable it to deal confidently 
with technology transfer, intellectual property and alternative rights regimes. It should, as a 
minimum, set up a central office to deal with such matters, with a manager reporting at high 
level. An immediate review of current proprietary science used by the Centres should be 
undertaken, so that any irregular situations can be put right as appropriate. It is needed to 
ensure that the Centres can deliver to clients the benefits of the research they undertake. 
3. The Centres’ existing Guiding Principles on IP should be revised, formalised and 
enforced. Most of the Panel is reasonably happy with the existing Guidelines, having 
independently arrived at similar conclusions, but feels that some inaccuracies need to be 
corrected and some changes of emphasis made. In particular, decisions to seek IP protection 
should be governed by clear mission-based rules. Unless this is done, Centres will follow 
inappropriate and inconsistent policies, causing confusion, legal liability and loss. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
. 
The Panel recognizes that its mandate is not to offer advice on whether or not the 
CGIAR ought to increase its use of proprietary technology or of biotechnology in general, 
nor is it to judge whether the current proliferation of intellectual property claim is beneficial 
or detrimental to the ultimate aims of the CGIAR. However, the Panel holds a range of 
views on these matters, and the various interpretations by different Panel members of the 
relationship of the CGIAR mandate to intellectual property and to biotechnology yield 
differing emphases with regard to recommendations about how the CGIAR ought to deal 
with intellectual property issues in agriculture. While some Panel members believe that the 
CG1A.R can further its mission by helping to “break the taboo” against the use of 
intellectual property by public institutions, others feel equally strongly that the CGIAR’s 
mission would be better served pointing out the dangers of the increasing use of intellectual 
property to the poor, and to the ability of public and other institutions to carry out and 
deliver research that will benefit the poor 
In spite of this wide divergence of views, the Panel has been able to reach consensus 
on a number of general points and practical conclusions. 
2. SITUATION 
For the purpose of this report, proprietary science means any process or product 
derived from scientific and research and development (R&D) activities that is legally 
owned or protected by intellectual property rights. 
There are various established forms of intellectual property applied to scientific and 
research developments, and these may include patents, plant breeder’s rights, trademarks, 
copyrights and trade secrets. There are also developing alternative rights regimes, 
including Farmers’ Rights, traditional resource rights, sui generis property regimes at 
national and local levels, collective property rights, and systems for managing resource use 
and access that are not based on property rights. Some of these are not fully implemented, 
so that it is uncertain how they will work in practice: for example, the implications of the 
rights of the States to regulate access to their genetic resources and information are still 
being discussed by parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Others are not yet 
well defined: these include rights which are under negotiation in the process of the revision 
of the FAO International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for. Food and 
Agriculture (Farmers’ Rights’). Both intellectual property rights and alternative rights 
regimes can potentially impact the way IARCs co-operate with national programmes and 
other partners in developing countries, and must be taken into account by the CGIAR 
system in developing policies and guidelines on this subject. 
’ The concept of Farmers’ Rights, as it is stated by FAO resolution 4/89, means “rights 
arising from the past, present and future contribution of farmers in conserving, improving, 
and making available plant genetic resources “. There are many views on the true meaning of 
Farmers’ Rights, and how to implement them. 
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The increased utilization of biotechnology and the strengthening and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights throughout the world have dramatically influenced the 
collaboration among research institutes in both nature and intensity. A recent survey 
among university scientists conducting projects funded by the private sector reveals that 
12% of them reported that industry support generated a trade secret from their university 
research; 24% said that their results could not be published without the previous consent of 
the sponsor; 44% said that, at least to some extent, industry support undermines intellectual 
exchange; 70% said that, at least to some extent, such support shifts towards too much 
emphasis on applied research; and 30% admitted that the future commercial application had 
influenced the choice of research topics2. 
Research and development in biotechnology are now seen by some in the 
international scientific community to be important for the integration of both conventional 
and biotechnological breeding activities for food production. Data compiled by the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA)3 show that 
during 1986 to 1997, approximately 25,000 transgenic crop field trials were conducted1 by 
45 countries on more than 60 crops and 10 traits. Of this total, 15,000 field trials were 
conducted during the first 10 year period, and 10,000 in the last two years. The global 
acreage planted with transgenic crops has changed from 7.0 million in 1996 to 3 1.5 million 
in 1997. Main transgenic crops in terms of the 1997 acreage are soybean (40%), corn 
(25%), tobacco (13%), cotton (lo%), canola (lo%), tomato (1%) and potato (cl%). The 
most frequent traits being incorporated into plant varieties in the US are herbicide tolerance 
(30%), insect resistance (24%), product quality (21%), viral resistance (10%) and fungal 
resistance (4%). Traits such as marker genes, selectable markers, bacterial resistance #and 
nematode resistance accounted for the other 4% of applications. The s&i&rice of these 
trials is disputed: for some, they suggest that the technology is useful and safe, while others 
doubt their utility and are concerned that safety cannot be guaranteed and that 
environmental impacts are not fully understood. 
Due to the changing intellectual property environment, the issue of Farmers’ Rights, 
and the advancement of biotechnologies, the CGIAR at its ICW96 adopted a set of guiding 
principles on intellectual property and genetic resources for its Centres, for their use on an 
interim basis (see Appendix D-l). Among other principles, it is stated that “The Centres 
will not claim legal ownership nor apply intellectual property protection to the germplasm 
they hold in trust, and will require recipients of the germplasm to observe the same 
conditions, in accordance with the agreements signed with FAO”4. It is understood that, 
based on this principle, genetic resources accessions delivered by the Centres from their ‘in 
trust’ collections are to be sent to users under Material Transfer Agree:ments (MTAs) 
imposing such obligations: this practice appears to be followed in most, but not all, cases. 
In a series of informal interviews conducted for the Panel, private companies 
responded that the CGIAR should be a forum for discussion about IPR and public ‘use 
‘Editorial. The Lancet 342 (88851, December 1 I, 1993 
3 James, C. 7997. Global Status of Transgenic Crops in 1997. ISAAA Briefs No 5. ISAAA: 
Ithaca, NY. 31 p. 
- 4 Hawtin, G and Reeves, T. 1997 Intellectual Properqt Rights and the Access to Genetic 
Resources in the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ICGIAR). Paper 
presented to the workshop on Intellectual Property Rights III- Global Genetic Resources: 
Access and Property Rights. 4-6 June, 1997, Washington, D.C., USA. 
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issues on a world-wide basis, and it should bring the interests of the private sector into the 
discussions. The CGIAR Centres should continue to adapt technologies to regional needs 
and act as a technology conduit to access proprietary technologies. These private sector 
interviewees also believe that the role of the CGIAR will diminish unless ways are found to 
access proprietary technologies. However, they believe that as the Centres get involved in 
IPR and their enforcement, they should not try to become businesses. but, rather, continue 
to serve the public interest. Another set of questions responded to by technology transfer 
officers at selected US land grant universities revealed that they are not aware of ever 
having received a request for proprietary materials from any CGIAR Centre. However, all 
acknowledged that it is likely that there are direct scientist-to-scientist exchange of 
materials that occur informally. All these universities would be willing to make proprietary 
materials available to the centres under standard MTAs (i.e., limited to research use, no 
transfer to third parties, new inventions must be reported, and ownership is based on 
inventorship). 
The use of biotechnology at selected CGIAR Centres was investigated by ISNAR 
in a study commissioned by this Panel’. The purpose of this study was three-fold: 1) to 
provide an assessment of the extent to which proprietary applications of biotechnology 
(technologies and materials) are being used at the IARCs; 2) to identify the potential legal 
implications regarding use of these proprietary technologies and materials, and 3) to 
provide a synthesis of findings and recommendations which stimulates further discussions. 
These technologies and materials were grouped according to their crop applications in 
cereals, non-cereals and other, and in eight categories as follows: transformation systems; 
promoter genes, insect-resistance genes, disease-resistance genes, selectable markers 
genes, genetic markers, diagnostic probes, and others. 
The results, based on responses from seven IARC?, show that some Centres are 
using “state-of-the-art” proprietary technology. A total of 166 applications of proprietary 
technologies being used were identified, according to the following: 45 selected markers 
(17 cereals, 26 non-cereals and 2 others), 35 promoters (18, 14 and 3), 29 transformation 
systems (12, 14 and 3) 19 insect-resistance genes (8, 11 and 0), 11 disease-resistance 
genes (6, 5 and 0), 10 genetic markers (4, 4 and 2), 3 diagnostic probes (0, 0 and 3), and 
14 other applications (6, 6 and 2). 
The majority of the categories of proprietary technology used by IARCs are 
protected by patents, though may be not in the countries where the CGIAR’s clients 
operate. Concerning the permission for use, authorizations were mainly formalized by 
means of MTAs, licenses and sublicenses. It is worth mentioning that for nearly 40 
research applications, the type of permissions were not known or lacking in the 
questionnaires. The survey also showed the need for immediate action by the IARCs to 
determine whether, and if so how, they need to revise or renegotiate licenses on the use of 
patents and other categories of protection. Also, where results are derived from 
proprietary science, some IARCs anticipate dif%culties in dissemination, especially in the 
5 Append!x C-l. ISNAR -- The Use of Proprietary Biotechnology Research Inputs at Selected 
CGIAR Centres. Report of an ISNAR Study Commissioned by the CGIAR Panel on Proprietary 
$cience and Technology. 
An essential condition for conducting the survey in a timely manner was the explicit 
guarantee of confidentiality. For that reason, IARCs are not identified in this report. 
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case, of improved varieties or germplasm of mandate crops. Some Centres are also. 
expecting to file for protection of new products. Examples are the potential patenting of an 
improved crop line with virus resistance; apomixis; and one vaccine. In addition, licensing 
is being considered for 11 different types of diagnostic probes. 
A preliminary analysis of trade flows (imports and exports) for CGIAR research 
crops showed relatively minor proportions of such crops being exported from developing 
to developed country markets. This indicates that, while there will be specific difficulties in 
particular cases, problems of intellectual property infiingement (by crops protected in 
developed but not in developing countries) may generally not be too serious (and for some 
crops, non-existent). This could of course change in the fUture.7 
In conclusion, some Centres may be operating in a risky situation due to limited 
information and knowledge of IPR management and are in need of :immediate IPR 
consultation for at least half of the technologies and materials identified. Also, Centres are 
relying primarily on MTAs generally issued for research purposes and not for development 
activities. Also, Centres are often unfamiliar with the implications of proprietary 
technologies regarding possibility for liability and implications for collaborative research. 
3. RATIONALE’ 
The Panel he agreed that proprietary science can impact, positively or 
negatively, the effectiveness of the CGL4R in addressing its mission. Currently, most of 
these impacts are inhibiting its effectiveness. If properly managed proprietary scieirzce 
can provide benefits, otherwise opportunities are being missed 
3.1 Access to Proprietary Science of Others 
Given the fact that the IARCs are already using proprietary technologies and 
materials in their research programmes, there are significant risks in not obtaining the rights 
to use these properties in applications important to the mission of the CGIAR. The primary 
risk of unauthorized use is not the threat of legal action against the IARCs, but rather the 
reluctance of intellectual property owners to share potentially useful properties with the 
Centres in the future. In order to obtain authorized access to such properties, the CGIAR 
will need expertise in the management of technology .transfer and related intellectual 
property issues. Establishing such a function will require signiscant personnel and financial 
resources. This may require diversion of resources (money, stti, effort) from work more 
directly related to the CGIAR’s mission. Further, to the extent that these a.ctivities would 
require such diversion, there is a risk that donors, partners and clients will obiect. 
On the other hand, there are a number of potential advantages from ,the 
establishment of CGIAR expertise in managing issues relating to intellectual property rights 
and alternative rights regimes. Such expertise will assure that the CGIAR has an effective 
’ Eran Binenbaum and Brian 0. Wright. On the significance of South-Nolth trade in IARC 
crops. Study commissioned by the Panel on Proprietary Science and Technolo,gy, CGIAR, 
7998. 
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voice in international discussions concerning these issues where they affect the utilisation of 
genetic resources. It will also be helpful in maintaining good relationships with various 
institutional and private partners, by demonstrating that the CGIAR recognizes and 
respects the rights of these partners in the territories where they are entitled to such 
protection. Good working relationships with these partners will be key to obtaining future 
access to technologies and materials which may be important to the CGIAR mission. In the 
event that the CGIAR cannot obtain authorized access to specific rights or resources, the 
IARCs will avoid making research investments in the development of technologies and 
materials which they cannot distribute. In the event that access to a specific resource is 
acquired for one centre, the CGIAR technology transfer staff should be able to negotiate 
for multi-centre access to that resource. 
If and to the extent that the CGIAR centres decide to use proprietary science, the 
following recommendations can be made based on the findings of the ISNAR study and the 
Panel’s discussions. There is a need to: 
(i) Acknowledge the use of proprietary technologies and materials by the IARCs. 
(ii) Review MTAs with regard to research, development and dissemination. There 
needs to be a system wide policy concerning MTAs with regard to their review and 
execution. 
(iii) Provide legal advice now for those areas noted as needing immediate attention, 
and increase awareness of legal implications regarding improved materials and genetic 
resources for the CGIAR system. 
(iv) Provide diverse expertise in intellectual property and alternative rights regimes 
for CGIAR centres. 
(v) Rectify, where necessary, the current situation by either negotiating appropriate 
(preferably, multi-centre) access to proprietary science, or abandoning its unauthorized use. 
3.2. Intellectual Property Protection for the CGIAR Dkvelopments 
The guiding principle for seeking protection for CGIAR developments must be that 
such protection will only be sought if and when it furthers the mission of the CGIAR. 
Furthermore, access and delivery of CGIAR-owned proprietary science to the poor must be 
guaranteed to the fullest extent possible. The same expertise developed for obtaining 
access to others’ proprietary science can be applied to the protection of technologies 
and materials developed by the IARCs, should the CGIAR decide to apply for 
intellectual property protection in any particular case. 
There are several notable risks to be considered. Obtaining protection will require 
substantial expenditures which may result in the diversion of fimds from other activities. 
To the extent that there are any financial returns from licensing such properties, it is 
unlikely that such returns would be sufficient to cover the costs of the programme for many 
years. There is also a concern that the capability to obtain intellectual property rights might 
skew the research agendas of the centres. Most importantly, some CGIAR partners view 
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proprietary science arising from public money, or applied to living material, as being 
inconsistent with the CGIAR mission, or even unethical. 
However, if a mission-oriented approach to seeking intellectual property right.s is 
properly managed, there are a number of potential benefits. The ability to license such 
rights can facilitate technology transfer when a private partner is needed to accomplish this 
goal. In joint ventures, such rights provide a basis for reserving rights to the CGIAR for 
the delivery of jointly owned properties to the poor. CGIAR ownership can be used as a 
means of market segmentation to assure access to those who cannot afford to pay for new 
technologies. In some cases, ownership could be used to obtain access to technologies 
and/or materials developed and protected by others, but essentially derived from CGIAR 
properties (e.g., the addition of a single gene to a CGIAR-developed plant variety). 
Intellectual properties could be used to attract local investments, as well as to facilitate 
capital formation in the countries where the centres are located. Finally, in the event th.at t 
licensed property becomes commercially successful, revenues generated could be used to 
support the work of the centres, and potentially, to provide returns to the original sources 
of germplasm, as mandated by the CBD. 
For most of the Panel, generating income will never be the main rea.son for seekcing 
protection. This must be clear, or it will be a constant temptation to divert the ,energies of 
the Centres away from their mission. Only a few developments generate income, and it is 
not easy to predict which, but all cost money to protect. This does not mean that if money 
is offered, it must be refused. 
A minority of the Panel believes strongly that significant developments of the 
Centres should be protected if they offer good prospects of financial reward. The money 
generated should be used for the mission, and for remunerating sources of germplasm 
(there are many possibilities, including paying farmers who preserve biodiversity, royalties 
to communities of origin supporting research into in sift conservation benefiting the poor, 
etc.). Not to protect such developments is to waste useful resources. 
4. STRATEGY 
Whether the Centres are seeking to use the proprietary science of others, or to 
protect their own developments, the same fundamental criterion applies: will what they do 
advance the mission of the CGIAR? If not, it is a diversion, either wasteful of effort or 
even dangerous. 
Examples of science that the Centres have already found useful are molecular 
markers and diagnostic probes. Work in crops of less or no commercial importance (e.g. 
yams, cowpea, cassava) will be particularly relevant. 
In the event that the Centres decide that they need access to proprietary technology 
of others to deliver benefits to the poor, how can they negotiate such access? Wii it be 
freely available? 
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4.1. How does the CGIAR motivate owners to share proprietary 
technology? 
4.1.1. Current Situation 
It is perhaps remarkable that the two main sources we consulted’ did not suggest 
major difficulties for the CGIAR in getting access to proprietary technology: at least for 
non-commercial outlets isolated (segmented) from commercial markets The International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA) was established to help 
developing countries obtain the benefits of biotechnology. Its President, Dr. C. James, told 
us that he had not had any experience of being refused access to others’ biotechnology, 
whereas in the Panel’s survey (Appendix C-2) both industry and universities expressed 
general willingness to negotiate licenses. 
These opinions, from two sources only, must clearly be treated with caution. Part 
of Dr. James’s skill in arranging deals no doubt lies in caretily preparing these in advance: 
he would not ask for licences that he thought there was no chance of getting. Similarly, 
the Panel’s surveys were conducted anonymously, and asked staff at working (rather than 
policy) level about generalities. If a particular item of important technology had been 
considered, or different staff polled, answers might have been different. Nevertheless, for 
whatever weight may be put on them, the results are encouraging. 
4.1.2. Why should companies license? 
There are several reasons why owners would be prepared to make technology 
available to the CGIAR for use in developing countries, either freely or on concessional 
terms 
Firstly, it is an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that the technology works 
and has advantages. This is of course balanced by a risk that the demonstration fails, not 
showing any advantage (or, much worse, actually doing harmg) causing the technology, and 
its owner, to be discredited. 
Secondly, where GM0 technology is in question, offering to demonstrate 
usefidness in the country can help to prepare it for wider applications of genetic 
technology, by encouraging the putting in place of legal regulations on safety and 
intellectual property. 
Thirdly, companies will be interested in forming partnerships with developing 
country partners. The CGIAR may be able to help them with this. Licensing will be a way 
8 It should be noted that the views of ISAAA and those who answered the Panel’s surveys 
are mostly of people from the North, from research organizations and from the private sector. 
We did not seek out the views of farmers, indigenous organizations or scientists in the South 
not linked in some way to NARS or the CGIAR. 
’ While no responsible company will run a substantial risk of an introduction doing significant 
irreparable harm, of course all other parties concerned with any introduction of this nature 
must check for themselves that such harm will not result. This is because there are 
disagreements about what risks exist and how serious they are, and in the nature of things 
the owner of the technology may tend to underestimate rather than overestimate these. 
8 
for companies without a market presence in a particular country to introduce themselves 
and become known, and for those who already have such a presence, to strengthen and 
extend it. 
Fourthly, philanthropic motives should not be overlooked. Companies as such may 
not have such motives, but their managers often have. Such managers typically believe 
very strongly in the benefits of what they are doing, quite apart from its potential for 
profits. They are very willing to share these benefits with fellow human beings, provided it 
does not cost them too much. This brings us to a crux. 
4.1.3. When will companies be unwilling to license? 
From the Panel’s survey (Appendix C-2), it will be seen that companies are 
unwilling to license if it leads to their losing control over the licensed technology. Lack of 
control may cause technical problems: for example, in the case of Bt corn it could result in 
the companies being unable to ensure a suitable management regime that would minimise 
the build-up of insect resistance. It will also cause major commercial problems if the 
licensed technology is used to compete with the licenser in profitable markets. 
A necessary condition for commercial owners to be willing to license their 
technology at all will be the ability for them to segment markets. If owners can retain 
profitable markets, where farmers find it pays them to buy improved seed. at a premium 
price, they will be able to license those who need the technology but cannot afford to pay 
for it. However, if they cannot segment markets, so that what they provide free or cheaply 
to the poor is then sold on, and competes with them in commercial markets, they will lose 
the latter and go out of the business of innovation. If they cannot segment markets, they 
can only supply at one price, which will be more than the poorest can afford. (!3ee 
Appendix D-4: also Lanjouw, 1997). 
4.1.4. How can markets be segmented? 
Technology markets can be segmented in two main ways, by product or by 
territory, Both depend on intellectual property rights, in varying degrees. 
ISAAA gave us an example of product segmentation. They brokered a dealt’ 
between Monsanto and the Mexican government to license Monsanto’s antiviral GM 
technology for use in potatoes. The technology was made available, free of charge. to 
Mexico for use in two locally grown potato varieties. There is no export market for thlese 
varieties, and little trade in them in Mexico, so they would not compete in markets in 
which Monsanto could charge an economic price. Here the segmentation was probably not 
dependent primarily on IP rights, so much as the difficulty of transferring the technology 
out of the varieties in which they were sold. Similar arrangements can be visualised in 
other crops, particularly crops which are of more importance for subsistence: than for trade 
(e.g., plantain cassava, consult also the crop statistics given in Appendix C-3). 
lo This deal is cited solely as an example of the circumstances in which owners may be 
willing to license proprietary technology. The Panel is not judging any other merits it may 
have or problems it may pose. 
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However, if proprietary technology is to be used widely for the benefit of the poor, 
it will be used in at least some crops that have substantial trading value. If markets for 
these are to be segmented, owners contend it will need to be done by formal intellectual 
property, typically patents or plant variety rights.” Such property can be made available _ 
under limited license, and not (say) for export. It is implied that export could then be 
prevented by use of IP rights in the importing country. 
The CGIAR may be able to take advantage of this situation to procure access to 
proprietary science for use in developing countries. 
4.2. Respect for Patents 
Two somewhat polarised views have been expressed about how Centres should 
regard patent rights to technology of other parties. According to the first, the Centres do 
not need to concern themselves unduly. They are using patented technology, but for 
research purposes; this is at least within the spirit of the patent laws, if not necessarily the 
latter in all cases. The owners of the technology are in many cases aware of this and have 
not objected; in any case owners are unlikely to sue, because of the bad publicity it would 
cause them. 
A second view is based on ethics. It is that the Centres, as bodies supported largely 
by public funds, have a duty to behave in an exemplary manner. This means that they must 
fully respect all rights of all parties, including intellectual property rights. If a patent has 
been granted on a technology, that indicates it is proprietary, and permission is required to 
work with the technology. According to this view, the possible invalidity of a patent, or 
even the fact of its non-existence in certain territories, so giving no legal rights in those 
territories, would be irrelevant. 
In our opinion, the second view is closer to the attitude the Centres should take. It 
may be true (we have not taken detailed professional advice) that in most countries most 
research work on patented inventions is covered by a ‘research exemption’. But there are 
probably exceptions. In any case, research is not the main problem. The Centres are 
producing products for use by their clients. If their clients are not free to use those 
products, because of the methods or starting materials employed in producing them, the 
work of the Centres is wasted. 
It will not do, therefore, to be casual about intellectual property. Even if the 
Centres are not sued themselves (and owners of IP who felt that their rights were being 
flouted might not be so complacent as has been suggested), their clients are at risk. While 
they have no obligation to police the private rights of commercial companies, Centres must 
not waste their energies in producing products which cannot be exploited for legal reasons. 
” MTA 3 are not enough here. While MTA ‘s make life just as difficult for large organizations 
as formal IP, they are of little use in this situation. This is because the remedy against breach 
of an MTA is primarily against the organization who signed it, rather than the person (or 
chain of people) who obtained material from them. If material gets out in breach of an MTA, 
there is often little to be done, even when it is known exactly what happened (not the usual 
case). For a patent, however, the source of the material typically does not have to be 
proved: only tihat it consists of. 
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However, this does not mean that all patents have to be respected everywhere 
without regard to other considerations. 
Firstly, a patent is granted by a national authority in respect of a specific territ’ory. 
The principle of territoriality is well recognised. Each country grants patents in respect of 
its own territory, as part of its national sovereignty. No country, or patentee, expects a 
patent in one country to give world-wide rights. There is no legal or ethical basis for 
ceding rights to a patentee outside the territory for which the patent is granted. 
Secondly, a patent is a restriction on the freedom of others, and as such must be 
carefully scrutinised. Patent offices have the prime responsibility to do this, but they are 
neither omniscient nor infallible. It can happen that a patent is granted which ought not to 
have been”. Where it is clear that this has happened, it is wrong to collude in the 
patentee’s unjust claims. A policy of accepting all patents at face value would be unjust. 
This is quite different from encouraging the Centres to take technical or legalistic 
objections to prima facie valid rights. 
Another possibly useful distinction is between bare patent rights ;and technology 
packages. Where the Centres co-operate directly with technology owners, and receive 
from them know-how, samples, vectors, as well as patent rights, they (are receiving a 
package of technology, and clearly will regard that package as the property of the owner, 
to be used only as the owner allows. However, a patent in itself does not give full 
ownership of technology, only specific rights in the territory in which it is granted: the legal 
right granted must be given 111 credit, but there is no basis for treating the patent as 
morally equivalent to absolute and universal ownership of the technology. 
4.3. How does the CGIAR decide when to seek Protection for its Teclhnologies and 
Materials ? 
Currently it is the exception rather than the norm for the CGIAR to seek 
protection for its developments. This may well continue: what is important is that each 
instance of protection be justtifiea by agreed criteria 
The CGIAR needs to establish a set of mission-based criteria for determining 
when it would be appropriate for the centres to seek intellectual property rights for th!eir 
developments. Based upon the current guiding principles, these criteria could be set 
forth as a series of questions, as follows: 
72 To give examples of patents which may fall into this category risks being g,ravely unjust. 
However, examples are necessary in order to make our meaning clearer. We quote two 
patents which have excited widespread comment and concern. Both are currently being 
reviewed by the issuing office: the results of the reviews may indicate whether the concern 
was jus tifed. 
US Patent 540 7,504 on turmeric for wound healing 
US Patent 5,159,135 on all genetically transformed cotton 
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4.3.1. Would intellectual property protection facilitate and/or ensure delivery of 
benefits to the poor? 
In any situation where a private sector partner would be needed to deliver benefits, 
and where that partner must make substantial investments to further develop the invention 
or material, then the availability of intellectual property rights can provide an incentive to 
make such investments. One example would be the development of a new vaccine. This 
situation might also exist for certain agricultural equipment, where the private partner must 
incur the costs of manufacture, especially if the potential market is small or geographically 
isolated. Another example, in the opinion of some Panel members, would be in plant 
variety development. There are several examples of known varieties with valuable 
properties which are not in use. Even when a breeding programme is complete, making 
plant varieties available for sale needs some further investment in demonstration and seed 
production. Joint ventures with small private companies (under conditions ensuring 
maximum distribution at minimum price) could promote such investment: some protection 
for the varieties would encourage the private partner to take part. 
4.3.2. Would intellectual property protection be necessary to ensure access to 
benefits for the poor? 
In some cases, intellectual property protection could be used to obtain access to 
technologies or materials protected by others, but essentially derived from CGIAR 
developments. For example, a single gene could be transferred into a CGIAR-developed 
plant variety. Protection of the original variety would provide a legal basis for obtaining 
access to the improved variety. Rights to the variety can also provide a means for market 
segmentation, based upon territories, thus enabling the CGIAR to make the improved 
variety accessible to those who cannot afford to pay. 
4.3.3. Could intellectual property protection provide rights in a fundamental new 
technology and/or material which could be used to obtain access to others’ 
intellectual property? 
An example of such a fundamental new technology would be the gene(s) for 
apomixis, which would be of value to multiple potential private partners. Such 
technologies could be used as bargaining chips to gain access to privately-owned 
intellectual properties. Ownership of such technologies by the CGIAR also provides a 
means for market segmentation. 
We are talking here of technologies which arise in the course of research directed to 
the CGIAR’s mission. We do not consider that research specifically directed to generating 
such technologies, specifically for use as bargaining chips, could be justified. 
4.3.4. Is partnering with other institutions required to further develop the 
technology and/or material? 
Many potential partners, including the NARS, will be interested in obtaining 
intellectual property rights for improvements and further developments made in joint 
ventures. CGIAR rights provide ,a way to reserve rights for certain mission-oriented 
applications. 
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4.3.5. Can delivery and access to the poor be accomplished by publishing or 
otherwise making the technology and/or material publicly &ailable? 
If the answer to this question is clearly “yes,” then protection should definitely NOT 
be sought. The technology or material should be made publicly available as soon as 
possible, and as widely as possible, in order to prevent others from obtaining ownership of 
similar developments. If the answer is maybe, based upon uncertain responses to the 
preceding questions, then judgement is required: application for protection should 
sometimes be made in order to keep all options open. If the answer is clearly “no,” based 
upon afErmative responses to the preceding questions, then protection should be sought in 
order to further the mission of the CGIAR. 
5. ORGANIZATION 
The following outline of a possible organizational plan is intended to demonstrate, 
as specifically as possible, the personnel resources, expertise and policy guidance needed 
for an effective intellectual property management programme. The two aspects of such a 
programme: 
1) access to others’ proprietary science, and 
2) protection of new developments made by the CGIAR Centres, 
are considered separately to underscore the differences in the resources required for each 
activity. However, it is anticipated that any programme developed would begin with a 
centralized resource centre and would require a local liaison at each Centre. 
Clearly, the expense of setting up and running the function will be substantial. To 
fund this, either additional resources will have to be raised, or resources will have to be 
diverted from existing projects. 
5.1. Access to Others’ Proprietary Science 
This aspect of the intellectual property management programme could be effectivIely 
managed by a centralized, dedicated managerial function. Effective management would 
require the following: 
(i) Input from the centres concerning technologies to which they or their clients 
need access. The management role would be to research the ownership of the 
technologies, make contact with the owners, and obtain information regarding the terms 
under which the technologies would be made available. 
(ii) Policy guidance regarding what terms would be acceptable to the CGIAR and 
to each centre. The management role would be to negotiate agreements with t.he 
proprietary technology owner(s) which are within the policy guidelines established by the 
CGIAR. 
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(iii) Sample or model agreements to use for future negotiations with the same 
owner for the same or similar technology. The management role would be to maintain a 
database of all agreements with all centres and to ensure that all centres obtain access to 
proprietary technologies under similar terms. Some of the agreements previously 
negotiated by ISAAA might serve as useful models. 
(iv) Staffing for the centralized managerial function. This should include a co- 
ordinating manager familiar with intellectual property issues and experienced in negotiating 
license agreements. Support staff will be needed to create and maintain the agreements 
database. 
(v) Legal advice regarding both intellectual property law and contract law in 
various jurisdictions. This can probably best be done with outside counsel which has 
established working relationships with a number of international associates. It would be 
difficult for inside counsel to give advice regarding so many different jurisdictions. 
(vi) The co-ordinating manager should report to the highest level. 
5.2. Proprietary Science developed by CGIAR Centres 
This aspect of the intellectual property management programme would require both 
local and centralized management. Effective management would require the following: 
(i) Clear direction from the CGIAR concerning the goal(s) of intellectual property 
protection. From a management viewpoint, it works best to have one clear, overriding goal 
to guide the decision-making process. 
(ii) Decision-making guidelines based on the goal(s) established by CGIAR. These 
guidelines would be used by both local and central management. 
(iii) Policies regarding ownership of inventions made by CGIAR/centres 
employees. These policies would have to operate on a local basis within applicable local 
contract law. 
(iv) Policies regarding invention reporting by CGIAIUcentres employees. Again, 
these policies would have to operate locally, but there should also be a reporting 
requirement from all of the centres to the centralized managerial function. These policies 
must be effectively communicated to employees. 
(v) Evaluation criteria, established by the CGIAR and based upon the guiding 
principles, for determining which inventions should be protected. The evaluation procedure 
should include a review of the technical merit, a protectability review in various 
jurisdictions, and a determination whether protection will help achieve the mission of the 
CGIAR. Evaluation committees should employ uniform, consistent standards and should 
include members with technical expertise as well as legal expertise. Such committees 
should probably operate on a local level, with guidance from the centralized managerial 
function. 
14 
(vi) Specialized counsel to file applications in various jurisdictions. This can 
probably best be done with outside counsel which has established working relationships 
with a number of international associates. However, inside counsel at the cemral 
management level would probably be needed to co-ordinate and supervise this activity, and 
to provide legal advice to the centres on an ad hoc basis. 
(vii) “Marketing” staff to publicize the availability of proprietary technologies from 
the CGIAR. This staff could either be local, centralized or both, and would1 be responsible 
for identifying and contacting potential licensees. 
(viii) Co-ordinating manager(s) familiar with intellectual property and experienced 
in license negotiations. Again these managers could be both local and/or central and 
would be responsible for negotiating agreements which are within CGIAR policy 
guidelines. In most universities which have intellectual property management offices, the 
marketing, negotiations and management functions are combined in one office. 
(ix) Support staff to create and maintain inventions and agreements databases. 
This could be a centralized function. The staff would need some understanding of 
international intellectual property law. 
(x) Support staff to monitor continually license agreements for compliance with 
terms. This could be a centralized function. The staff would need some understanding of 
international contract law. 
(xi) The co-ordinating manager(s) should report to the highest level. 
(xii) Periodic portfolio reviews, both at the local and central levels. Due to the 
financial costs associated with prosecuting and maintaining intellectual property rights in 
multiple jurisdictions, periodic portfolio reviews will be needed to keep such costs at a 
minimum. 
6. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
We have largely confined ourselves to practical recommendations, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the CGIAR has to deal with an existing situation, rather than an ideal one. 
Secondly, while we have been able to reach a fair measure of agreement over what should 
be done in the existing situation, we disagree markedly as to what an ideal situation should 
be. 
We have debated such questions as to whether the CGIAR should campaign against 
all intellectual property on life-forms, or whether it should promote extension of IP to 
promote innovation, transfer and adoption of useful technologies. These are: not issues that 
our Panel can hope to resolve, though we think it worth while to set out some of the 
positions below, particularly as some aspects of them may be unfamiliar to some readers.. 
The Panel did not debate the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), but notes 
that, in addition to the benefit-sharing issues mentioned by Dr. Juma in Appendix D-2, the 
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CGIAR has a ‘vital role in. helping to stem the dangerous pace of genetic erosion world- 
wide by aiding in the implementation of CBD Articles 8 and 9, the in si& and ex situ 
conservation of biodiversity, which include agricultural biodiversity. The in situ and ex situ 
conservation of agricultural biodiversity are mutually interdependent, tid both are linked to _ 
the continuation of cultural diversity, which is addressed by CBD At-tide 8J calling for the 
protection of the traditional practices relevant to biodiversity of indigenous and local 
communities. 
Though such issues are unresolved, this does not mean they are unimportant. To 
stimulate the debate, and reinforce the claims of agriculture on the world stage, a number of 
the Panel members believe the CGIAR has a unique opportunity to act in world councils as 
a voice for the poor. The CGIAR needs to carry the debate forward in appropriate 
committees, arrive at considered conclusions and present these to international bodies such 
as TRIPS, the CBD, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and UPOV, using its concrete 
experience, and its moral authority as an international public institution serving the poor. 
The unresolved issues are illustrated by three divergent viewpoints, as presented 
below. 
6.2. Different Viewpoints 
6.2.1. Viewpoint 1 
Some Panel members believe strongly that advanced biotechnology and the 
development of transgenic crop varieties are central to the goal of increasing food 
production in developed and developing countries, and that only in the context of 
strengthened intellectual property regimes will these proceed efficiently. On this basis, they 
conclude that at least some of the IARCs ought to increase their own activities in these 
areas and ought actively to seek access to the proprietary science of others and to make it 
available, with due intellectual property protection, to their clients. This would call for 
substantial increases in the capacities of the CGIAR and its centres to gain access to and to 
manage proprietary science. 
In addition, from this perspective, the strengthening of intellectual property rights, 
and the promotion of the ‘intellectual property paradigm’ more broadly, is something which 
the CGIAR can and ought to encourage. In this view, this will help to create the context of 
incentives and regulations that is necessary for the advance of agricultural research by the 
private sector and for the distribution of the benefits of proprietary science via international 
markets, as well as, to a lesser degree, via the CGIAR and other public institutions. Failure 
to extend IP, or (worse) weakening of existing rights, will not increase exchange of 
germplasm or transfer of technology, but rather will inhibit it. Proprietary technology will 
not disappear, but be protected in other forms (e.g., trade secrets) which are much more 
inimical to widespread dissemination than patents or plant variety rights. 
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In this ‘view, the CGIAR should support the extension of IP under TRIPS and 
campaign against proposals for ‘universal exhaustion’i3 of patent rights, which will prevent 
commercial owners from segmenting markets. 
For one statement from this viewpoint, see Appendix D-7. - 
Proponents of this view consider that it would be sensible for the CGIAR to seek to 
develop ‘bargaining chips’ from protection of the Centres’ improved germplasm. To 
protect this, plant variety protection is most appropriate, but only available if Centres 
release finished lines, rather than breeding material. 
Some who hold this view are gravely concerned about the idea of the CGIAR 
acting as a ‘voice for the poor’. They believe this would inevitably polarise the CGIAR’s 
supporters; put at risk its scientific credibility; and undermine its ability to continue its 
enormously valuable technical contribution to the welfare of the poor. 
6.2.2. Viewpoint 2 
In this view the primary work of the CGIAR is achievable for the most part without 
a major shift of emphasis toward the use of proprietary science. From this perspective, the 
increasing use of proprietary property in agricultural research and development is a fact of 
life, whether regrettable or beneficial, to which CG centres need to adapt; and use, insofar 
as possible, to further their missions. 
However, in this view, the very substantial costs of increasing CGIAR capacity to 
manage intellectual property must be weighed carefully against potentially competing neleds 
of an arguably underfunded CGIAR system. Even more worthy of careful comparison with 
the foregone benefits of alternative uses of CG resources would be the costs to IARCs~ of 
seeking and defending greatly expanded protection of their own innovations, whether to 
prevent their appropriation by private claimants, although such ‘defensi,ve’ protection 
should be sought in some cases, or for use as ‘bargaining chips’ to obtain the proprietary 
science of others. 
Those who adopt this viewpoint typically feel the proper scope of patents is limited 
to commercial activities and are concerned that research activities are being unreasonably 
inhibited. They therefore consider that it would be worthwhile to campaign for a clearer 
definition of the ‘research exemption’ under patent law. They also agree with Viewpoint 1, 
that the CGIAR should campaign against proposals for “universal exhaustion”. 
6.2.3. Viewpoint 3 
A third view considers that the most ‘advanced’ agricultural science,, and that most 
central to the CGIAR mission of alleviating hunger and poverty and serving the majority of 
farmers, is not ‘industrial’ biotechnology and the development of transgenic plant varieties. 
l3 “‘Exhaustion” of the patent right takes place when a product is lawfully sold under the 
protection of a patent. The buyer is free to use it and sell it on, because the patentee has 
had his profit. Typically, the buyer only has this right in the country where the product was 
sold: but under ‘international exhaustion’ the buyer may sell anywhere. 
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Rather, it is the better understanding, improvement, and adaptation to various developing 
country conditions of sustainable, diversity-based agricultural systems, and the related 
management of genetic, crop, soil, and other agricultural resources. Such science does not 
exclude the use of biotechnology, but calls for a process-driven approach involving high 
inputs of local knowledge and the fruits of participatory research. - In this view, the 
CGIAR’s comparative advantage will lie increasingly in this area, and becomes even more 
important in the context of the larger trend toward the privatization of research institutions 
world-wide and the growing influence of private, product-oriented, market-led, profit- 
driven priorities on the research agendas of public institutions. The CGIAR need not 
become involved with proprietary science: it should only make research investments in 
technologies that the private sector is not investing in, and for which the only ‘market’ is 
the poor. 
From this viewpoint, the proliferation of intellectual property rights and-the 
‘intellectual property paradigm’ is in itself a barrier to accomplishing the CGIAR mission 
because: 
(i) Proprietary claims frequently entail the private appropriation of the values of 
crop varieties and technologies, developed by farming communities or by public 
institutions, by others whose contribution to the improvement of the plant materials or 
process is minor or nil; 
(ii) Proprietary claims can and already do inhibit the open exchange of biological 
materials and traits, and impede the sharing of scientific and traditional knowledge, and can 
thus have a chilling effect on innovation and creativity at the local, national, and 
international levels. This is detrimental to the goal of improving the well-being of those 
unable to afford to purchase privatized technologies, varieties and their products (poor 
consumers and small-scale farmers)’ as well as to the effectiveness of researchers in 
beleaguered public institutions working on their behalf; and 
(iii) The broadened application of intellectual property to agriculture already shifts 
research and extension agendas in the direction of products that are profitable in larger- 
scale markets and/or produced by large transnational firms. This process accelerates the 
replacement of diversity-based farming systems, ‘and eco-social contexts in which they 
survive, by monocultures and increased uniformity, both genetic and cultural, at the 
expense of diversity. 
In this view, the CGIAR should point out the degree to which the increased use of 
intellectual property impinges on the CG system’s ability to carry out its mandate, and the 
negative consequences of the standardised implementation of the TRIPS accord. It should 
actively oppose its possible extension to include requirements on all nations to extend 
uniform patent protection to plants and animals or to otherwise reduce the scope for the 
formulation and implementation of mi generis intellectual property regimes. (See 
Appendices D-5 and D-6). It should work in concert with others to establish an alternative 
IPR regime that will enable it to conduct its historic mission of making freely available 
varieties to the poor and to developing countries. 
For one statement from this viewpoint, see Appendix D-6. 
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7. RECbWMENDATIONS 
The Panel has made three recommendations as follows: 
(i) In dealing with proprietary science, the CGIAR must be guided by its mission. 
How it advances the mission will determine the need for: 
l Access to the proprietary science of others; 
l Protection of the CGIAR’s developments; 
l Preventing misappropriation by others of CGIAR material held in trust; 
l Selection and design of research programmes. 
Above all, research and development should never be undertaken as part of a 
strategy to, or simply in the hope that it will, generate either cash to support CGIAR work, 
or bargaining chips for acquiring rights to technology from others. On protection, Panel 
members are divided: some would never approve seeking protection primarily to produce 
bargaining chips, while others would find it appropriate in certain situations. 
(ii) The CGIAR must promptly acquire relevant expertise to enable it to deal 
confidently with technology transfer, intellectual property and alternative rights regimes. It 
should, as a minimum set up a central office to deal with such matters, with a manager 
reporting at high level. An immediate review of current proprietary science used by the 
Centres should be undertaken, so that any irregular situations can be put right as 
appropriate. It is needed to ensure that the Centres can deliver to clients the benefits of the 
research they undertake. 
(iii) The Centres’ existing Guiding Principles on IP should be revised, formalised 
and enforced. Most of the Panel is reasonably happy with the existing Guidelines, having 
independently arrived at similar conclusions, but feels that some inaccuracies need to be 
corrected and some changes of emphasis made. In particular, decisions to seek II? 
protection should be governed by clear mission-based rules. Unless this is done, Centlres 
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I. ‘Executive Summary 
This report presents the findings and conclusions of a study regarding the use of 
proprietary applications of biotechnology at selected CGIAR centers: The Proprietary 
Science and Technology Panel of the CGIAR commissioned ISNAR to conduct the 
study in November 1997, to gain an understanding of the current technologies and 
practices employed by the various centers. The purpose of the study is to: (I) provide 
an assessment of the extent to which proprietary applications of biotechnology are 
being used at the IARCs; (2) present the potential legal implications for consideration 
by the IARCs regarding use of the identified proprietary technologies and materials; 
and (3) give a synthesis of findings and recommendations in order to stimulate further 
discussion of the study. 
ISNAR conducted a rapid survey among 7 CGIAR centers regarding the application of 
proprietary research inputs, and prospects for generating proprietary products from 
these inputs. Every center responding to the survey currently uses proprietary inputs 
(technologies and materials) for biotechnology research. In total, the centers reported 
using 45 discrete proprietary inputs in a total of 166 individual applications. Selectable 
marker genes, promoters, and transformation systems show the broadest utility across 
centers. 
While the utility in a broad range of applications is evident, the legal implications for 
their use and distribution of resultant products are not always clear. The findings of the 
study indicate that for a substantial number of these applications of plroprietary 
technology, there is no clear knowledge or information regarding their intellectual 
property protection (IPP). In addition, it is shown that a large number of these tools 
have come to the centers without written agreement, leaving the centers’ legal 
responsibilities unclear. Thus, the use of proprietary materials and technologies poses a 
clear challenge to the CGIAR. 
ISNAR also requested information on products expected to result from the application 
of proprietary inputs, whether any diiculties were anticipated regarding use and 
dissemination, and if centers are planning to take out any form of IPP for these 
products. A few centers have considered the implications of legal agreements for 
disseminating research outputs, and report a number of cases where they foresee some 
sort of distribution limitations due to contractual arrangements. On the question of 
seeking protection for research outputs, three were identified which may be patented 
and another 11 for which the use of other protective measures is anticipated. 
Considering the findings of the survey, we recommend that the Panel on Proprietary 
Science and Technology examine the following points: 
l Where several centers are using the same proprietary tools, it may be advantageous 
to collaborate in the acquisition of such technologies; 
l For those applications of proprietary tools which permission for use is, unclear, 
immediate legal advice must be arranged; 
l Actual experiences regarding the use of material transfer agreements and licenses 
should be analyzed and exchanged among centers, and possibilities for standard 
formats explored; 
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l The legal implications of, and possible restrictions on disseminating the products 
resulting from proprietary technologies deserve further research; 
l Guidelines managing intellectual property at individual centers should be reviewed, 
and possibilities for a system-wide policy or guidelines considered; 
l Given the limited familiarity regarding the implications of using proprietary 
technology, the CGIAR should create more awareness on this subject and develop 
expertise for managing intellectual property, system-wide and at individual centers. 
II. Purpose and Methodology 
Background andpurpose 
During the past few years, the CGIAR has discussed how to best use biotechnology 
when addressing CGIAR research objectives. At the CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting in 
May 1997, two expert panels were established to explore this question, one panel on 
General Issues in Biotechnology, and one on Proprietary Science and Technology. The 
latter panel was set up to deal with the legal issues and ramifications of proprietary 
science and the complex partnerships that have arisen. The panel felt that gaining an 
understanding of the current technologies and practices employed by the various 
centers would be an important first step in this process. Therefore, in November 1997, 
the CGIAR Proprietary Science and Technology Panel requested ISNAR to conduct a 
review of the use of proprietary applications of biotechnology at selected CGIAR 
centers. 
The purpose of the study is three-fold: 
l To provide an assessment of the extent to which proprietary applications of 
biotechnology (technologies and materials) are being used at the IARCs. 
l To present the potential legal implications for consideration by the IARCs 
regarding use of the identified proprietary technologies and materiaIs. 
l To give a synthesis of findings and recommendations in order to stimulate further 
discussion of the study. 
Methodology 
Considering the above mentioned conditions and purpose of the study, ISNAR decided 
to conduct a rapid survey among CGIAR centers regarding the application of 
proprietary research inputs, and prospects for generating proprietary products from 
these inputs. A list of relevant proprietary technologies and materials was constructed 
by contacting several technical experts. Following this review, the technologies and 
materials were grouped into eight categories as follows: 
l Transformation systems; 
l Promoter genes; 
l Insect-resistance genes; 
l Disease-resistance genes; 
l Selectable marker genes; 
l Genetic markers; 
l Diagnostic probes; 
l Others. 
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Two concise survey tables were developed to determine which prloprieta$ 
technologies or materials from the categories above are being used at the ce:nters. On 
the first table, respondents were asked to provide more information on specific 
applications, the means by which intellectual-property protection is provided (patents, 
plant breeders’ rights, or other means), and how the center obtained permission for 
research (e.g., license, or material transfer agreement). On the second table, 
information was requested on the research products to be derived from the 
technologies or materials identified, the dissemination of results from this research, and 
if any intellectual-property protection was to be sought by the center itself 
In consultation with the Panel Chair and with TAC, ISNAR selected 7 c.enters to 
complete the survey, reflecting a balance between research on cereal crops, non- 
cereals, and livestock. The selected centers were initially contacted during the first 
week of December 1997, by approaching their respective Directors General and 
subject-matter specialists. All 7 centers returned their completed survey forms during 
the second half of December. The data received were organized using database 
management software, facilitating the analysis of qualitative information. Separate 
records were generated for specific proprietary technologies and materials reported by 
each center. This method of data entry created many individual records, which helped 
to ensure the uniqueness of data from centers having multiple crop or research 
mandates. 
A note on conjidentiality 
An essential condition for conducting the survey in a timely manner was the explicit 
guarantee of confidentiality. Therefore, specific information collected from each IARC 
is not presented in this report. Rather, the study focuses on its findings regarding 
system-wide trends and recommendations for the use of proprietary science. 
Applications of proprietary technology have been categorized under general headings 
such as “cereal”, “non-cereal”, and “other”, to avoid showing direct relationships 
between the findings presented in this report and an individual center. 
Ill. Context for Biotechnology and IPR at the IARCs 
Recent discussions on IPR in the CGIAR have been primarily driven by two related 
developments, (1) the increasing importance of biotechnology in centers’ research; (2) 
the growing position of the private sector in international agricultural research. 
Since the early 198Os, the IARCs have invested in buildmg up their infrastructure and 
human-resource capacity for biotechnology research. Annex 1 provides examples of 
specific IARC-based biotechnology initiatives. By now, most IARCs have specialized 
units or divisions for molecular biology and other techniques covered by .the term 
“biotechnology”. Annex 1 illustrates the wide range of collaborative activities in 
biotechnology that they have initiated. According to recent TAC figures (TAC, 1997), 
* 2 For the purpose of this study, proprietary technologies or materials refer to those which are privately 
owned, managexl or protected through some sort of intellectual property. This means that IPP for the 
technology or material must exist in at least one country, taking into account the territorial 
implications of IPP. 
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the centers &e spending about US$ 24 million per year on biotechnology research. Of 
that amount, about 27% is related directly to livestock (primarily animal health). 
Roughly 15% of the total expenditures go to genetic engineering. It is safe to state 
that, for the CGIAR client countries, the IARCs have become -a key player in 
agricultural biotechnology. Although combined R&D investments in agricultural 
biotechnology may be small compared to leading private-sector companies, the IARCs 
have developed an extensive network of research collaboration with advanced research 
institutes, public and private, in industrialized countries and developing countries. 
During the 1997 CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting and International Centers’ Week, the 
chairman of the CGIAR has stated that the centers’ capacity for biotechnology 
research must expand. 
Together with a growing involvement in biotechnology, concerns have been expressed 
at CGIAR meetings about intellectual property rights. Since 1980, intellectual property 
protection for agricultural inventions has been strengthened. A growing number of 
countries include the possibility to protect living material under their patent laws. Plant 
breeders’ rights have been introduced and/or strengthened. The resulting possibilities 
to legally protect agricultural innovation has stimulated the involvement of the private 
sector in agricultural research. In addition, many advanced public research 
organizations and universities routinely protect their research results. This situation 
may create difficulties for the IARCs in accessing, using or protecting relevant 
technology. 
Discussions on IPR in the CGIAR have been many, and will not be repeated in this 
report. To date, no general policy or guidelines regarding IPR have been issued by the 
CGIAR. In 1992, the CGIAR adopted a “working document” on genetic resources and 
intellectual property, containing guidelines on IPR management. The working 
document retirms that the resources maintained in the gene banks at the centers 
should be freely available, and that the centers should not seek legal protection for 
their innovations unless it is absolutely necessary to ensure that developing countries 
have access to new technologies (“defensive patenting”). The centers should not seek 
intellectual property protection for income-generating purposes and will not view 
potential returns from intellectual property protection as a source of operating fimds. 
The document also states that any intellectual property right acquired by a center 
should be exercised without compromising in any manner whatsoever the fbndamental 
position of the CGIAR regarding free access by developing countries to knowledge, 
technology, materials, and genetic resources (CGIAR, 1992). 
Policies regarding IPR may vary among individual IARCs, as they are autonomous 
organizations. A few centers have drafted their own PR guidelines, which basically 
follow the principles laid down in the CGIAR working document. 
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IV. Analysis of Information 
Utility of proprietary technologies and materials 
Every center responding to the survey currently uses proprietary inputs (technologies 
and materials) for biotechnology research. Table 1 lists the complete range of the 
proprietary technologies and materials used by the centers, their means of protection, 
and the specific number of applications reported in center research programs. In total, 
45 discrete technologies and materials were reported, covering the eight technology 
categories introduced above. As most centers appIy these technologies and materials in 
several mandated commodities, we recorded 166 specific applications of proprietary 
research inputs. Of the eight technology categories surveyed, selectable marker genes, 
promoters, and transformation systems show the broadest utility across centers (Figure 
1; Table 1). This clearly demonstrates the role which proprietary technologies and 
materials have assumed in research at the IARCs, as is true for advanced research 
centers globally. 
- 
While some applications are being clearly applied in a “research only context,” other 
technologies and materials become part of germplasm or other products suitable for 
release to the national agricultural research institutes, NGOs, other partners, or even 
directly to farmers. The wide-spread importance of specific selectable markers (BAR, 
GUS), promoters (CaMV/35S), transformation systems, and of AFLP genetic markers 
is evident, while in other cases, more center-specific needs are apparent, such as for 
insect and disease resistance. 
Similarities and differences among centers with regard to the use of these materials and 
technologies are seen through “center profiles”. These profiles also help visualize 
relative degree of emphasis and differences among multi-crop and single-crop centers 
(Figure 1). Most but not all centers are using proprietary genetic markers, a set of 
disease- and insect-resistance genes, and some centers have integrated these 
technologies more than others across their mandated research portfolio. 
Figure 1. Center profiles indicating use of proprietary technologies and materials 
q Genetic markers 
q Disease and insect resistance genes 
q Transformation systems, promoters, and 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Table 1. Proprietaq technologies and materials covered by survey. 
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U&y acrosi research categories 
In Table 2, the various technologies and materials are sorted by their use in relation to 
mandate crop or other types of research, by grouping the tiormatibn collected into 
three research categories. These groups provide a means to analyze the information 
without revealing individual center responses. The categories were defined as follows, 
based a list of possible research targets for the CGIAR centers: 
Cereals: maize, rice, wheat, sorghum, Snger millet and pearl millet 
Non-cereals: beans, cassava, tropical forages, potato, sweet potato, chickpea, 
cowpea, pigeonpea, groundnut, lentils 
Other: diagnostics, livestock health, microbial systems, general developments 
These findings reveal an almost equivalent use of inputs among centers working on 
either cereal or non-cereal crops, with fewer applications recorded for the non-crop 
centers and programs. The distinction reflects the significant degree of emphasis placed 
on crop research in the CGIAR system. The information, as shown in the individual 
center profiles (Figure 1) clearly indicates the wide-spread utility of and reliance on this 
range of inputs across the system. 
Table 2. Applications of proprietary technologies and materials by research 
category. 
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Means of protection andpermission for use 
Figures 2 and 3 show the means of protection given to the technologies and :materials 
analyzed in the survey, and how permission for use was obtained by centers. While not 
all of these proprietary inputs pose difEculties regarding intellectual property or for the 
dissemination and use of resulting products, it is appropriate for centers to explore any 
potential difEculties in this regard. 
As indicated in Figure 2, in more than 30% of the applications of proprietary 
technology, centers indicated that they have no clear knowledge or information on the 
type of IPP provided for a particular proprietary tool. Thus, a high potential exists for 
infringement of legal conditions regarding the use of these proprietary technologies and 
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m&erials. In gddition, Figure 3 indicates that more than 35% of the applications are 
done without written agreement, leaving the center unclear as to its legal 
responsibilities, or as to how the use of the proprietary tool has been achieved. 
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Figure 3. Proprietary technologies and their permission for use. 








MTA = material transfer agreement; N.K. = not known; N.W.A. = no written approval; n.a. = no 
information provided to ISNAR from responding center. 
Note: In some cases, permission for use is covered in more than one way, e.g., a combination of 
MTA and license. For these cases, the first way of permission mentioned was used for the graph. 
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Combining the results presented in Figures 2 and 3, it is possible to suggest degrees of 
legal attention or concern warranted by the use of these technologies (Table 3). 
Immediate legal attention should be considered when the information on protection 
and permission are unknown or when there is no written approval for the use of 
proprietary technologies. About 40% of the total technologies and/or materials 
identified appear in this category, which constitutes a potentially r-is@ situation for the 
CGIAR system. As a consequence of not understanding or taking into account the 
legal conditions of the use of proprietary technologies, the access to such technologies 
could be restricted or dished with regard to national program partners. 
Table 3. Potential for legal advice needed by CGIAR centers regardifilg use of 
proprietary technologies and materials 
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MTA = material transfer agreement; N.W.A. = no written approval; N.K. = not known. 
Potential dij’jficulties for specific technologies 
Some technologies and materials pose more difEculties than others with regard to 
permission for use. As seen in Figure 4, when permission for use has been obtained, it 
is generally achieved through MTAs, licenses or a sublicense. However, for each 
technology category, except diagnostic probes, the centers are using a number of 
technologies and materials without written agreement, or for which permission is not 
known. Permission to conduct research using the majority of technologies has been 
obtained through MTAs or licenses. While obtaining permission for research is the 
general rule, exceptions do exist. For example, with transformation systems where the 
permission to use speciftc systems (pEG/protoplasts and electroporation) is not clear. 
Similar problems exist for the use of selectable markers, genetic markers, and various 
insect and disease resistance genes. However, it should also be noted that MTAs may 
secure permission for research, but do not generally confer permission for use and 
dissemination. Thus, review of each individual MTA is crucial to achieve clarity 
regarding IPP implications for the centers. 
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Figure 4. Agreements and potential difficulties regarding permission to use 















Expected products and concerns regarding dissemination 
The information received was next analyzed with regard to expected products and 
difficulties anticipated for their dissemination. In addition, indications of whether or 
not any form of IP is expected to be sought by the IARCs was requested. The purpose 
for using these technologies is to develop an output, such as improved mandate crops, 
. animal health products, new genetic constructs, or new research methodologies. The 
suniey results indicated a total number of 58 outputs or products in these categories. 
Restrictions may also exist for the use, dissemination or f&her production of these 
outputs, based on the fact that the proprietary inputs have IPP. Responses from the 
centers regarding these issues are presented in tables 4, 5, and 6. 
More than 40% of the responses indicate that centers do not have enough information 
or knowledge to anticipate diiculties in the post-research use and dissemination of 
outputs generated from proprietary technologies. Consequently, one could imagine 
that some outputs developed with proprietary technologies will encounter problems 
with use and dissemination, especially if exports occur to countries where the 
technologies have IPP. Many centers have yet to take into account the extensions of 
protection and permission requirements of such technologies. 
A few centers have considered the implications of legal agreements for disseminating 
research outputs, with 14% of the responses foreseeing some sort of limitations. For 
example, a contractual arrangement between a private multinational, as owner of the 
input technology, and one center indicates that outputs can be distributed only among 
specific countries. There is an ex-ante understanding of the restrictions and limitations 
for the dissemination in this case, and it should be studied fbrther by the CGIAR. 
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Table 4. Products expected from the application of proprietary tools 
i Improved mandate i 
i crops 
36 i Improved cereal and non-cereal 
1 varieties with enhanced insect-, 
! 
! 
I.. ......................................... ........... g.. ...............................  ............... i fungal- and virus resistance p....” ... ....... I.. ........ ............. ... I .... ......................................... 
; Diagnostics 11 ; Diagnostic tests for tropical 
j 
y i livestock diseases “.._...._..............“.....~. 4 “_^..” 1........1..-“1..... ^ ^ ..__.... f..“.-” --.......-....“.... _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I............ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __j 
i Vaccines 1 i Vaccine for East Coast Fever : I”““““““““‘“““““““““” 
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. . . ..^....._. r’ ^..........._ I ..^.._” . . . .._..._.” --...i . . . . . . lll..l.......-l- . . . . . . . . . . . ..-...........-.......-.........-............... _ i 
10 f Transformation protocols; genetic 
: markers 
i 
Table 5. Diffkulties anticipated regarding dissemination or use of products 
because of proprietary or legal issues. 
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The CGIAR, along with other institutions producing international public ,goods, is 
considering options to ensure that developments from center research programs will be 
able to reach intended beneficiaries. As recently stated in the “End-of-Meeting Report” 
from International Centers Week, 1997: “7%e CGIAR stands for free flows of 
germplasm and it has no profit motive. However, it mq have to think of defensive 
patenting in order to stake out a claim and ensure access. ” 
In this regard, information was also collected to assess the degree to which centers are 
planning to patent or otherwise protect inventions. As seen in Table 6, threle outputs 
were identified which may be patented and 11 other outputs where the use of other 
protective measures is anticipated. 




i Not i Not known i Yes: Patent or other means 
, 
i anticipat& i 
f 
f . . . ..a.....  . ..^........-- ._I_. &...“....-- .-““-“...l.........““........- . . . . -... 
1 ltiproved i 
-.-~~..-“.....-i ..-......{ 
: mandate crops i 
79 ; 16 f 1 (patent) 
+-. -^-^^_--.__ --.. . ..+--..--..-- : -.-.&------...-.- ....-.__.._..ll_ i 
j Diagnostics i - i - i’.. . . . . . . . . . . ..-......“.“.........” . . .. . +.--.- II (other) 
: Vaccines 
.“.....“..“--“-......f.-....--........” . . . . . . . “..“...--...“.“.....j 
i. . . . . . . . . . . “...“.--.-...“..i . . . . -..-- 
a”----/- 
1 (patent) ----.“--“..-...-~--.-------- 
i Others 
-..-.....-....-...._.--. i 
5 1 (patent) A 
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V. Legal Analysis and Options 
This section provides a “first look” at the information collected with regard to 
potential legal implications for both CGIAR centers and their NARS $utners. 
Using MICAS 
As is indicated in Figure 2, the most common means used by the centers for obtaining 
legal arrangements for research using Proprietary technologies is through Material 
Transfer Agreements (MTAs), followed by licensing. Such extensive use of 
agreements and licenses is certainly a new fact of life for the CGIAR system, and for 
publicly-finded agricultural research in general. The study did not attempt to collect 
information on the range of providers supplying material to the centers. No doubt 
many sources are involved, indicating the growing range of materials applicable to 
CGIAR research. 
This study also did not review the type of MTAs being used by the centers. The 
simplest of such agreements takes the form of a letter accompanying the proprietary 
technology. In this situation there is a question as to whether a supply on unilaterally 
prescribed terms constitutes a biding agreement with the recipient. 
MTAs may range from the simple letter agreement described above to a more 
compendious contract that sets out all the relevant terms for the use of proprietary 
technologies. Typical clauses may include: (a) use permitted for research purposes 
only; (b) obligation to share royalties or profits; (c) grant back to the supplier of any 
intellectual property rights generated from derivative material; (d) disallowance of 
patent applications for the supplied material; (e) maintenance of conf?dentiality of any 
trade secrets which are provided, or which may be generated by the acquirer; (f) 
deferment of publications to secure patenting; (g) acknowledgment of the supplier in 
connection with any publications; and (h) warranties for example in relation to 
biosafety clearances. 
Given the various legal obligations (as discussed below) that are generated by MTAs, 
particularly those of the comprehensive contract type, the popularity of the MTA as a 
means of obtaining proprietary technologies, and, the likelihood that MTAs will be 
formulated and imposed by the technology supplier, the CGIAR system may wish to 
review and use standard formats for MTAs which help guide the CGIAR Centers in 
these complex matters. For example, a useful precedent for MTAs in relation to 
agronomic materials is the MTA suggested by Barton and Siebeck (1994) for the 
exchange of genetic resources. 
Enforcement of obligadons 
Where legal obligations are imposed by MT&, the relevant center must be in a 
position to honor its obligations under the agreement. For example, where the 
proprietary technology involves the supply of a trade secret and confidentiality 
obligations are imposed, the center must be in a position to police the confidentiality of 
the material supplied. This may involve the establishment of a secure system of 
operation and the placing of researchers and visitors under confidentiality obligations. 
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In the event of a default under an MTA, it will be the CGIAR center which will ,be the 
likely defendant to a legal suit and not the individual actually responsible for a relevant 
infringement. This is because it will be the center which is the signatory to the: MTA. 
Management of legal obligations 
Given the increasing legal complexity involved in the supply of proprietary 
technologies, which may raise matters of contract law, intellectual property law, 
biodiversity and biosafety law, technology transfer and competition law (where 
restrictive provisions are imposed) it would be useful for a CGIAR center to have a 
person who is the primary legal administrator. This person would be responsible for 
ensuring the compliance of stafT with any legal obligations generated by MTAs. 
Similarly, this administrator would be responsible for ensuring the compliance of a 
center with terms of any intellectual property licenses. The survey discloses that after 
MTAs, licenses are the commonest way of acquiring proprietary teclmologies. 
Therefore, it should be reiterated that MTAs, licenses and sub-licenses impose direct 
legal obligations upon the CGIAR centers. The large number of these agreements 
suggest that it may be prudent for the Director Generals to delegate the ovlersight of 
their legal obligations to a legal administrator. 
Management of proprietay tools 
Where different CGIAR centers are using the same category of proprietary tools to 
obtain the relevant technology, it may be advantageous to cooperate in the acquisition 
of such technologies. For example, the survey indicates that CaMV/35S is clearly the 
promoter of first choice. In this situation the opportunities for coordination are self- 
evident. Precedents for such coordination have been seen for research collaborations 
supported by international biotechnology research programs such as the Agricultural 
Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity (ABSP). 
Management of IP obligations 
Table 5 indicates that for the 58 products reported, no dissemination constraints due to 
legal arrangements are expected for 37% of them, while for 40% of these products, the 
centers reported not knowing if such constraints may exist. These statistics indicate the 
need for CGIAR centers and for the system: (i) to develop IP expertise to analyze 
potential limitations and (ii) to designate an officer to administer legal obligations. The 
necessity to develop a capacity to manage IP obligations may be incumbent in the 
constitution of the center. 
For example, the IRRI Policy on InteZZectuaZ Property fights provides that IRR.I will 
apply for intellectual property protection under Principle 7 in ex:ceptional 
circumstances “to ensure availability to developing nations of advanced biological 
technologies or biological materials” and under Principle 9 on new agricultural 
equipment.‘ Principle 12 requires that “IRRI will devise, maintain and monitor 
employee policies on intellectual property rights.. .and policies or agreements to 
govern its relations with visitors and research collaborators”. The implementation of 
principles such as these will obviously require an internal system of intellectual 
property management. The high percentage of applications reported in Table 3 and 
Appendix C-l - The Use of Proprietary Biotechnology Research Inputs at 
Selected CGL4R Centers - Page 17 
products in table 5 where IP implications are “not known”, may suggest that there is 
work to do in this regard. 
. 
Similarly, the relatively small amount of intellectual property protection being sought 
by centers (Table 6) may be attributed to an unfamiliarity with ll? issues, that suitable 
IP options are not yet developed and approved, as well as the traditional reliance on 
development of goods and services developed as international public goods. 
The promulgation in April 1994 of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), as a membership obligation for countries joining the World 
Trade Organization, includes a requirement that signatory countries protect plant 
varieties through either patent protection or a sui generis system. Responses to the 
survey indicate that proprietary technologies and/or materials covered under PVRs 
have not been used by the centers. But, the presence of the mandatory obligation in the 
TRJPs Agreement concerning the introduction of this form of IP protection provides 
an additional reason for CGIAR centers to familiarize themselves with D? obligations. 
The TRIPS Agreement also modifies the rules relating to compulsory patent licensing 
and contains a chapter concerning restrictive conditions in intellectual property 
licenses. These international legal developments make it incumbent upon CGIAR 
centers to understand their relations to these evolving global conditions. 
VI. Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
Proprietagv inputs used extensively in center research. Information collected in this 
study indicates the extent to which CGIAR centers are using and integrating 
biotechnology as part of their ongoing research programs. The centers have moved 
from a time in the early to late 1980s when biotechnology was virtually non-existent, 
or limited to plant tissue and cell culture and other in vitro technologies, to a point 
where these associated technologies and materials are being used to develop a new 
generation of agricultural inputs, many focused on products arising from 
transformation (Table 1,3, 4; and Figure 1). 
Extensive use of MTAs. Important contributions towards this work include proprietary 
technologies and materials, meaning that they have been developed and/or under 
protection by private sector research organizations. The extensive use of such 
materials means that as centers take on the transformation of mandate crops, the 
development of vaccines and diagnostic probes, and provide for marker-assisted 
breeding, that their dependence on licenses, MTAs, and other agreements with the 
private sector (Figure 3) becomes of greater importance. 
Limited IPP sought by centers. Each center questioned indicated that it is using 
applications of proprietary biotechnology. Each center also has many avenues from 
which these materials and technologies are being received; although implications are 
for their eventual use and dissemination to center partners are not always clear. While 
the technologies received by centers are numerous, the number of resultant products 
that are expected to be patented by the centers is very low (Table 6). 
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Centers operating in a challenging and compZex environment, hfghiighting need for 
increased IP consultations. The use of these materials and technologies pose a 
challenge to the CGIAR. While their utility in a broad range of applications is evident, 
the legal implications for post-research use and distribution are not always clear 
(Tables 3 and 5). To illustrate this point, selected examples where the permission for 
use of proprietary technologies and/or materials is not clear have been taken from the 
completed survey forms and compiled in Table 7. 
Table 7. Selected examples of proprietary technologies and related disseimination 
concerns. 
i rulings in favor of 
i . . . i multinational company . . .._..-...._..__................................. *...i     . . . . . . . . . . .._...................-.... e.&-.-...........I^^- _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +...--- i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-...-...-..........-......... ( 
i Cry I ab i Patent I MTAlSublicense ; Unclear IPR position, non 
I. .......................................................... 6 ........ ...........  ............. ....... ..---............- ................................... i anticipated .for poor farmers i 6  .......... ..-............... ...... ............. . ....... ........... i 
i AFLP marker genes . ......... ; Patent 
j 
---- .... ... .- ..................... . _” .._-. T .._............. ..........  . .............. T.. ........ ..I---- .................. ^ ............ i Under investigation ............ .............. ........ ..- ........... 
; Bacterial gene codon ; Patent ‘i MTA 
c-“-- - 
i Unclear given current 
.-.......-. < 
i 
p-.. i controversy ............. ..... ~““. ............ ...... y’-‘- ........... 
Agrobactenum 
.” -11.....-...1...... + - ............. __ I ................ ...“. ............. I ................ ^ -....-..- ................................. -....-. i
. !. i Patent . ......... .._....................-.....- ..........  +.- _...-......_ .......... - ....... .... i No written agreement i NK, to be negotiated 7”“““” ^I..............__. ....................... p--. .... ._...--..- . ..I 
i CpTl i Patent i . ................................................ ..- I  ........... I . .. - ..- .. I~ I ....... i No written agreement I NK, to be negotiated +....-. ....... ._ ............. ...................... 
i Coat protein genes i Patent 
y ^ ................ ......................... _......_ ; 
-_-- “““” ........................ . ..^” ....... ._ .. ...... I I..._ ..I I. ............. i No written agreement i . ..” _..--- ....................... -......... ................................................ ( 
: AFLP markers 
- $..-... - ?” - 
5.. : Patent 
. -........_........._..- 
i ..... ....................... -.................- .. j.. ............................. _ ...I ... : No written agreement i NK, to be negotiated +-. .... ._ .................. - . ..^............^ .... +. .. .......... ..... ...... ..............................................  
i Kanamycin marker i Patent :. . . ...................................................... .& - ....-..-........................-  i No written agreement i NK to be negotiated i ... ........ ......... . . ...... ......................... J . ...... .. ....... ............................. 
i No written agreement i NK, to be negotiated 
~.......~..~ ....... 
i Snowdrop lectin gene j Patent i . . . . . . . _ .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ .. . .._..I..... . . . . . . . . “-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-.... I ..-..-..........--. q. . . . . . . . . “.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?“” -.... I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
i 
_...................................s.. j 
i ” . . Stilbene synthase i Patent I License i None reasonable foreseeable . . . . . . . . ..-..................................~..~-..... ; 
i 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . ..-......... f....-. .-...........-........-............. ‘: _ ..._” .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-................ “...5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
PEP Carboxylase i Patent : License and MTA f Limited to certain countries i 
i. i need approval from 
r . ..-.... _ .. . ..-........................... _ . . . . . i multinational company . . . . . . . . . . . 
i Xa 21 gene 
. . . . . . + . . . . . . . . ..^..S --...-.....” . . . . . .&- --.. “.......” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “.I~ . . . . “..? -,....._ .. . . . . ...” 
; Patent i MTA/Sublicense 
. . . . .._.-..............................- i 
; Exclusion of certain 
; . . . . . . . . . . . + i countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ ...-... _ .. . . . . . ^  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..W.........” . 
f Bacterial gene codon f Patent 
 . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . ..._” . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-... _II-_ . . . . ..-....... + . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-.............-.....-.-....-...... __  ..-.....--..... ..i 
i License ; NK 
t modified for plant ! 
NK = not known 
Some of the inputs identified have a more global use, while others are relevant to only 
one or two centers. No matter which, the extent of their use and the fact that some of 
these applications will become available to the NARS, NGOs and other partners 
through new products, argues for the need of consistent, system-wide legal advice. 
Finally, there are a few implications from the study illustrating complexities for the 
centers regarding use of newer, more advanced technologies: 
l centers are usually certain as to the type of IPP provided for proprietary 
.technologies, but they are not as clear with regard to receiving authorized use for 
these inputs; 
l research at the centers has benefited from proprietary technologies and materials by 
virtue of the fact that they are in common use, but this also means that ,they are 
using “older generation” technologies or materials; and, 
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l centers not able to obtain authorized use could have more limited access to recent 
or improved technologies. 
VII. Recommendations 
Based on the information in this report, the following recommendations are made for 
the Panel on Proprietary Science and Technology: 
1. Centers may wish to acknowledge the use of proprietary technologies and 
materials in their research programs as one means of demonstrating collaboration, 
and highlighting the scale of such contributions; 
2. Given the limited familiarity regarding the implications of using proprietary 
technology, the CGIAR should create more awareness on this subject by 
developing system-wide and center expertise for managing intellectual property;- 
3. Where several centers are using the same proprietary tools, it may be advantageous 
to collaborate in the acquisition of such technologies; 
4. Immediate legal advice must be arranged for those applications of proprietary tools 
which permission for use is unclear; 
5. Review of experiences and conditions regarding material transfer agreements 
should be analyzed and exchanged among centers, possibilities for standard formats 
explored, and legal implications determined regarding possible restrictions on use 
and dissemination; 
6. Given the range of proprietary technologies being used, guidelines for managing 
intellectual property at individual centers should be reviewed, and possibilities for a 
system-wide policy or guidelines considered. 
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June BlaIock. Interviews With Selected Commercial Companies and 
Universities. 
ACCESS TO THE PROPRIETARY SCIENCE OF OTHERS 
A preliminary informal survey of intellectual property owners was conducted to 
determine whether it would be possible to obtain authorized access to protected 
technologies and materials for applications important to the mission of the CGIAR. 
Five multinational corporations which own plant biotechnology-related intellectual 
properties in multiple jurisdictions were contacted, as well as five major U.S. land 
grant universities with extensive agricultural research programs. In order to obtain 
candid responses, the parties interviewed were assured anonymity. All interviewees 
have responsibilities for managing and licensing intellectual properties for their 
respective organizations. None have policy-making authority, although all have 
input into policy decisions regarding intellectual property matters. 
The corporations were asked the following questions: 
l- Does your company have any ongoing or previous working relationship(s) 
with any CGIAR center(s)? If so, what type of relationship(s)? With which center(s)? 
If not, for what reasons? 
2- Does your company currently market products in any country(ies) where 
CGIAR centers are located [list provided]? In other developing countries? What are 
your marketing plans in these countries for the near future? Do you find intellectual 
property protection necessary and/or useful in these markets? 
3- Would your company be interested in/willing to cooperate with the 
CGIAR to make new technologies available to the world’s poor? 
4- Under what general terms have you/would you be willing to make 
company-owned proprietary technology available to the CGIAR centers for 
research? For local distribution? For export to other countries? 
5- Would the availability of intellectual property rights for 
technologies/materials developed at the CGIAR centers make possible future 
working relationships with the centers more or less attractive to your company? 
6- What role, if any, do you see for the CGIAR centers in the development, 
transfer and distribution of new technologies/materials in the future? 
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The following is a compilation of the responses received: 
Ouestion 1 
Those who responded yes were most likely to have worked with CIMMYT’ and/or 
IRRI. The types of agreements included materials transfer agreements for company- 
owned materials, research agreements and testing agreements using com:pany- 
owned technology. There is one patent license currently under negotiation for 
center-owned technology. None were aware of any examples where germplasm or 
other materials had been received from any CG centers, although research managers 
might be better able to answer this question. Those who responded no to this 
question said that the centers are not viewed as an important source of either 
germplasm or technology by their company. 
Question 2 
All responded that they market products worldwide. There is most likely to be a 
strong marketing effort in South America, and least likely to be a strong effort in 
Africa. All companies indicated that they apply for IP rights in all countries where 
such rights are available and enforced. Where rights are not available, or not 
enforced, they do not market the latest innovations, and they do not develop new 
technologies for crops localized to these geographic areas. All agreed that it is 
essential to improve II? protection before can afford to make any major investments 
in these countries. 
Question 3 
All responded yes, and some are already cooperating with various CG centers. An 
important caveat is that it depends on the technology and the risk associated with 
uncontrolled distribution. There was much more concern about the appropriate 
management of herbicide or insecticide resistance than there was about the potential 
loss of II? rights. All said that they need assurances that there are effective 
mechanisms to prevent “trickle back” of protected materials into key markets. 
Question 4 
The primary issue is management and control of distribution (see response to 
Question 3). All are willing to make materials available under standard materials 
transfer agreements (no commercial use, no distribution to third parties), jii 
principle. However, there is concern about the enforceability of these terms. They 
probably would not share the most valuable materials. All would be willing to 
make materials available for local distribution on a case by case basis, with proper 
controls. For example, distribution could be limited to locally adapted varieties 
only. Materials intended for export use would be subject to a commercial license 
agreement. 
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Question 5 
All said that the availability of F rights for technologies and materials developed by 
the CG centers would make working with the centers more attractive. IP rights need 
only be obtained in important commercial markets, such that distribution to 
subsistence farmers could continues as always. Even if the company was only able 
to obtain a nonexclusive license, it would still have value because it would 
contribute to an “orderly marketplace,” and the company could be assured that their 
competitors were no getting a “free ride.” A couple of caveats: most public sector 
institutions overestimate what technology/materials will be commercially useful, 
and the CG centers will need a knowledgeable II? management/licensing staff to 
make such a program work. One suggestion was that the CG centers could transfer 
IF’ rights to the NARS for management. 
Question 6 
The CGIAR should be a forum for discussion about IF’ rights and public use issues 
on a worldwide basis, and it should bring the interests of the private sector into the 
discussion. The CG centers should continue to adapt technologies to regional needs 
and act as a technology conduit to subsistence farmers. The role of the CG centers 
will diminish unless ways are found to access proprietary technologies. However, as 
they get involved in II? rights and enforcement, the centers should not try to become 
businesses. They should continue to serve the public interest 
The universities were asked the following questions: 
l- When your university licenses intellectual property related to crop 
improvement, what public use exemptions are usually included in the agreement? 
2- Does your university normally (or has it ever), sought patent protection in 
the countries where CGIAR centers are located pst provided]? In other developing 
countries? If so, what public use exemptions are included? 
3- Has your university ever made proprietary technologies/materials 
available to any of the CGIAR centers? If so, under what terms? If not, why not? 
4- Has your university ever used university-owned intellectual property 
rights as bargaining chips to obtain access to another party’s intellectual property? If 
so, what additional information can you provide? If not, are you aware of any 
examples where a public sector institution has used this approach? 
The following is a compilation of the responses received: 
Question 1 
In exclusive and partially exclusive licenses, rights are retained for the university to 
do research, including with third party non-profit organizations. Where U.S. 
government funding is involved, rights are retained for U.S. government use. Use in 
developing countries is usually not an issue, because these countries are usually not 
included in the license agreement due to a lack of enforceable intellectual property 
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rights. This issue is only explicitly abdressed in cases where there is funding from 
the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Some universities retain rights for state crop improvement associati,ons for some cro:p 
varieties. This does not apply to utility patents. 
Question 2 
The answer is generally no, except for Mexico. Otherwise, IP rights are sought only 
in countries which are of commercial interest to the licensee. Licensees frequently 
want rights in South America, but seldom in Africa and Asia. Public use exemptions 
for subsistence farming and non-export production are seldom discussed in the 
license negotiation. Generally, this is viewed as an enforcement issue for the 
licensee. There is an operating assumption that the licensee would not enforce 
patent rights against subsistence farmers. 
@e&ions 3 
They have never received a request for proprietary materials from any CG center 
that they are aware of. However, all agreed there has probably been scientist to 
scientist transfer of materials. All would be willing to make proprietary materials 
available to the centers under standard materials transfer agreements (limited to 
research use, no transfer to third parties, new inventions must be reported and 
ownership is based an inventor ship). Other use, such as transfer to subsistence 
farmers, could be determined on a case by case basis, and would depend on rights 
already granted to a commercial licensee, the local availability of patent rights and 
assurances from the centers regarding distribution controls. Export woulld be the 
main concern. 
Ouestion 4 
None of these universities has ever done a cross license, although several are under 
discussion currently. Because the universities are required to share revenues with 
inventors, there is concern about how to value (in monetary terms) a cross license for 
the purpose rewarding the inventors. Several universities have m-licensed 
technology to make a total IP package more valuable. This is also done toI provide 
access to dominant patent rights for small company licensees. However, usually 
companies would prefer to negotiate directly with each other. Apocryphal examples 
of cross licenses for multimedia or software technologies were mentioned, but no 
details were available. 
Conclusions 
The general willingness of these intellectual property owners to provide access to 
their proprietary science is encouraging, but it does not in any way assure that access 
will be available to any particular property. Agreements will have to be xlegotiated 
on a case by case basis, dependent upon the owner, the particular property and the 
specific use intended by the IARC requesting access. However, it should be possible 
to obtain similar terms for all IARCs for a particular property. 
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1. The Issue 
An important issue confronting the International Agricultural Research Centers 
(IARCs) and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is 
whether intellectual property rights on technologies and genetic materials from developed 
countries might in the future jeopardize the free supply of those technologies and materials 
to IARCs. In particular, if developing countries (“the South”) export to developed 
countries (“the North”) IARC crops’ that incorporate technology or genes that are subject 
to Northern intellectual property rights, Northern suppliers might in the future take legal 
action to make IARCs or their clients pay for proprietary technology and genetic 
materials. 
How big a problem might this be? In the long term, the answer depends in part on 
the future significance of sales of IARC crops in markets offering strong intellectual 
property protection for the relevant processes and products. In the near future, sales are in 
general most likely to encounter strong intellectual property rights in countries of the 
North, although stronger intellectual property protection is spreading to other countries 
under the provisions of the TRIPS2 agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In predicting the likely volume of such sales, a good place to start is with recent 
trade data. Accordingly, this report, prepared as a broad overview prepared to inform the 
deliberations of the Expert Panel on Proprietary Science and Technology of the CGIAR, 
focuses mainly on the question: “How significant are exports from South to North of 
IARC crops, in absolute terms and relative to domestic production and to total exports?’ 
2. The Data 
Raw data on agricultural trade and production were obtained from the FAOSTAT 
database, made available on the Internet by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
of the United Nations. Note that this data set does not provide bilateral (i.e., country-to- 
country) trade data. It does provide annual commodity-level production, export and 
import data for each country. Thus it will indicate United States wheat exports or Russian 
wheat imports, but not U.S. exports to Russia. 
’ Crops which are the focus of IARC research are for convenience denoted ‘IARC crops’. 
* TFUPS stands for “Trade-related Intekctual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods”. 
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For this report we mainly used data for the year 1995. This is ,tie most recent year 
for which FAOSTAT currently provides trade data. Thus, the tables are a one-year 
snapshot (with the exception of Table 5b). In general, this will suffice for our purposes, 
since most trade flows do not exhibit extreme year-to-year fluctuatibns. However, some 
do.’ 
The total quantity of imports on a worldwide basis should closely correspond to 
the total quantity of exports for a given commodity. Factors such as time lags in 
reporting, loss or destruction of traded goods en route and misclassification of a 
commodity between exporting and importing country can account for some of the 
differences. However, for a number of crops, percentage differences over 10% between 
world exports and imports were noted, suggesting significant data error.4 In order to 
maintain a degree of consistency between import and export quantities without embarking 
on a major data-correction exercise, we adjusted import data by multiplying all import 
figures by the ratio of world exports to world imports for the crop in question. 
3. Discussion of Tables and Graphs 
Table 1 shows indicators of importance of selected crops in international trade. 
The table includes IARC crops as well as a few non-IARC crops. The latter, coffke, 
cocoa, grapes, jute, mangos and tea, are included for comparison purposes.’ 
The table ranks crops according to value of world exports. Note that each border- 
crossing counts as trade. Sometimes commodities will be shipped from country A to 
country C via country B. In such cases, double-counting of exports and im.ports occurs.6 
In the third column of the table, a measure of the value of world output is provided. In 
order to value output, we use export prices’. The fourth column lists world exports as a 
percentage of world output. Note that this percentage could conkeivably be greater than 
3 Table 5b and Figure 3c provide examples of large fluctuations. 
4 In 1995, world net exports (exports minus imports) as a percentage of world exports, as reported in 
FAOSTAT, exceeded ten percent for the following categories: Beans, Dry; Beans, Green; Cow Peas, 
Dry; Jute; Millet; Pigeon Peas; Plantains; and Sweet Potatoes. Note that none of these commodities 
belongs to the top-ten of export commodities (ranked according to value of 1995 expofis). (Note that in 
these footnotes, FAOSTAT crop categories are capitaked.) 
’ Some other important no&MC crops, such as Sugar and Cot&on, are not included in Table 1. 
6 Thus, in a sense, our figures provide upwardly biased estimates of trade volumes. However, it may be 
argued that for our specific purposes our figures are useful. Problems related to proprietary technology 
and genetic materials are more likely to occur in cases of multiple border crossings. 
’ Since FAOSTAT does not report dollar value of production of agricultural commodities, a price index 
was calculated for each commodity as (dollar value of exports) / (quantity of exports), using world 
totals. This ratio was used as a price for valuing quantities of each commodity in dollars. The 
FAOSTAT data consistently report exports using the FOB (free on board) valuation istandard. Since 
exported goods tend to be of higher quality than average, and since transportation costs from the 
production center to port are presumably included in export price, an upward bias in calculated values 
of production is likely. The export price index of Rice (FAOSTAT code 042) was used to compute the 
value of Rice, Paddy in world output. 
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100 due to the aforementioned double-counting of exports. The flflh column lists value of 
output of developing countries, again .valued at export prices. The sixth column shows 
output of developing countries as a percentage of world output. 
The final column gives net imports - defined as imports minus exports - of 
developed countries as a percentage of output of developing countries. This statistic tells 
us how significant is the overall South-North trade flow for developing countries. Ifit is a 
large positive percentage, we know that a large fraction of Southern output is exported to 
the North. One should, however, be cautious in interpreting this statistic, especially where 
it assumes negative or small positive values. For instance, for soybeans the statistic has a 
value of -3.1 %. To conclude that Southern exports of soybeans to the North are 
insignificant would be a mistake. As we see in the market share tables (Tables 3-lo), the 
United States and Brazil are major exporters of soybeans, while the European Union is a 
major importer. In fact Brazil is a major exporter of soybeans to Europe, even though the 
overall trade flow of soybeans is from North to South. 
Of all the crops listed in Table 1, only bananas, coffee, cocoa, and tea display large 
positive percentages in the last column; however, the latter three are not of immediate 
interest to us because they are non-P&C crops. As for bananas, unfortunately our data do 
not distinguish between cooking bananas and dessert bananas. Cooking bananas are 
predominantly for local consumption, whereas the international market for dessert bananas 
is relatively very large. This is an important distinction for our purposes, because in fact 
dessert bananas can hardly be considered an IARC crop - IARC banana research’ focuses 
on cooking bananas. ’ Thus we can conclude that for none of the IARC crops there is a 
clear overall tendency for trade flows to be from South to North. 
Figure la shows a selection of eleven crops ranked according to value of world 
output. For each crop, it shows output and exports of the world and of developing 
countries, all in U.S. dollar terms. From this graph, it is evident that for most crops trade 
is dwarfed by output. In other words, the vast majority of IARC crop output is never 
traded across national borders. 
Figure lb displays only part of the information contained in figure la. It omits 
output and focuses entirely on exports. Among IARC crops, rice is by far developing 
countries’ most significant export crop in value terms. In addition, Southern exports 
dominate international markets for cassava, groundnuts and beans. 
Table 2 basically contains the same information as Table 1 (except for the fact that 
it omits non-IARC crops), but the crops are now arranged in a different way, namely by 
* Two IARCs conduct Banana research LPGRIONIBAP (International Network for the Improvement of 
Banana and Plantain, a part of IPGFU, located in France) and IITA (International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture, located in Nigeria). 
’ The research efforts of IPGWINIBAP and IITA are directed at cooking bananas’(also known as “starch 
bananas”), not the dessert bananas (also called “sweet bananas”) that dominate South-North trade. 
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IARc.‘o 
Tables 3 - 10 and Figures 2 - 6 break world aggregates down into :sub-aggregates 
for eight groups of countries: Low-Income Developing Countries”; Brazil; China; Rest of 
Middle-Income Developing Countries’*; Transition Economiesr3; United States; European 
Uni~n’~; and Rest of Developed Countries’5. There is one Table -for each group. The 
Figures focus on developing countries. 
Tables 3-10 provide market share measures for each of the eight groups. These 
were calculated using raw data from FAOSTAT on imports, exports and ;production, all 
lo The classification by IARC relies in part on recent IARC reports. It is not exhaustive. As can be seen in 
the table, centers share responsibility for some crops. 
‘I Our term “Countries” is not synonymous to “independent states”. Developing Countries include Low- 
Income Developing Countries and Middle-Income Developing Countries. Low-Inc’ome Developmg 
Countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin Bhutan Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central-African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haini, Kiribati, Laos, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, h4yanmar, Nepal, 
Niger, Rwanda Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, ;Somalia, Sudau, 
Tanzmia, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia. 
I2 Middle-Income Developing Countries include Brazil, China, and the Rest of Middle-Income 
Developing Countries, which include American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 
Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Botswana, Bouvet Islands, British 
Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Damssalam, Cameroon, Canton Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Christmas Islands, Cocos Islands, Colombia, Congo Republic, Cook Islands, 
Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Guiana, French Polynesia, French South Territories, Gabon, 
Gaza Strip, Ghana, Greenland, Gmnada,. Guadeloupe, Guam, Guatemala, Guyana, Heard and 
McDonald Islands, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran Iraq, Jamaica, Johnston Islands, 
Jordan Kenya, Korea (North), Korea (South), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Macau, h4alaysia, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia, Midway Islands, Mongolia, 
Momserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Niue, Norfolk Islands, Nothern Marianas, Oman Pakistan Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Pitcairn, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Reunion, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Singapore, South Georgia, Sri Lanka, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, Saint Vincent, S miname, Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, U.S. Virgiu Islands, United Arab Emirates, 
Urugay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Wake Island, Wallis Islaud, Western Sahara, and Zimbabwe. Note that 
several Asian 7igers” as well as some oil-exporting countries (and perhaps some other countries like 
the Bahamas) might be more properly class&d as high-income countries. 
I3 Transition Economies include AIba&, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzsum, Latvia, Lithuaum, 
Macedonia, Moldova Republic, Poland, Romauia, Russian Federation, Slovak@ Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkma Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia. 
l4 The European Union includes Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finlaud, Frauce, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
I5 Developed Countries include the Europeau Union, the United States, and the Rest of Developed 
Countries. The Rest of Developed Countries include Andorra, Au&al@ Canada, Faeroe Islands, 
.Gibraltar, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, San Marina, South 
Africa, Svalbar~ Switzerland, and Vatican City. 
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measured in metric tons.16 We obtained data for these groups of countries by adding up 
values for constituent countries. This approach is appropriate for production. With trade 
data, aggregate exports and imports (as separate items) fail to differentiate between trade 
within a group of nations and trade to nations outside the group. Again, this is a _ 
consequence of the fact that FAOSTAT does not provide bilateral trade data. 
For each group of countries, we included only crops that are in one way or another 
significant.” The columns of Tables 3-10 are largely self-explanatory, except for the sixth 
column. FAOSTAT does not provide consumption data. We calculated “consumption” 
(C) quantities from the accounting identity C = Y + M - X, using the available data for 
production (Y), exports (X) and adjusted” imports @I). This approximation entails 
possible distortions due to commodity storage for consumption or export in a later period. 
In Table 3, we see that dry beans account for more exports (in value terms) from 
low-income developing countries than all other IARC crops combined. Another salient 
fact is that though exports from the poorest countries, dominate international markets for 
cow peas and pigeon peas, the size of these markets is very small compared to 
international trade in many other crops. Figure 2a demonstrates that what is true for 
developing countries in general, namely that exports are only a small fraction of output of 
IARC crops, holds a foTtiori for low-income developing countries. In figure 2b” we see 
that rice imports are by far the most significant feature of the poorest countries’ trade in 
IARC crops. 
Table 4 highlights the fact that soybeans are the only IARC crop of which Brazil - 
a major player in several non-NRC crop markets - is an important exporter. 
Table 5a shows that Chinese producers have significant international market shares 
mainly in beans, groundnuts, and sweet potatoes. Interestingly, notwithstanding the 
enormous Chinese production of rice, Chinese rice exports were relatively very small, and 
net Chinese rice exports were even negative, in 1995. At this point, however, the reader 
should be mindful of the perils of a one-year snapshot. As we see in Table 5b and Figure 
3c, Chinese rice exports exhibit large fluctuations; for example, in 1994, they were almost 
ten times as large as in 1995. Relatively small fluctuations in Chinese output lead to large 
I6 In some cases, we needed to make adjustments to commodity categories to make trade categories 
compatible with production categories: 
(1) There is a single category of Cassava in production data, and three categories (Dried, Starch and 
Tapioca) in trade data. For the group trade data we used the Dried Cassava category. 
(2) only Green Coffee is represented in production data, while Green and Roast coffee are represented in 
trade data. Trade in Green and Roast Coffee is compared to production of Green Coffee. 
(3) Groundnuts have a single category in production data but two in trade data (In-Shell and Shelled). 
Total (In-Shell and Shelled) Groundnut trade is compared to production of Groundnuts in Shell. 
(4) Only Rice, Paddy is represented in production data, whereas trade data are for Rice flotal). 
” Crops for which all four percentages are below 5 % are omitted from Tables 3 - 10. 
‘* Recall that we adjusted imports to make aggregate world imports match aggregate world exports. 
Combined with our method for computing consumption, this implies that aggregate output equals 
aggregate computed consumption. 
I9 Compared with Figure 2a, Figure 2b contains no additional information; it omits production. 
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fluctuations in exports or’imports for a number of crops. This is due to the fact that - once 
again - trade is small compared to output, as is demonstrated in Figure 3a. Finally, as 
most vividly illustrated in figure 3b, not only for rice, but for all four most important 
crops*’ in Chinese trade, exports were much smaller than imports in- 1995. As we see in 
Figure 3c, China has been a major importer of wheat during the entire period 1986 - 
1995. 
Next, consider Table 6, which provides information about the category of middle- 
income developing countries excluding China and Brazil. This is a very large and disparate 
group of countries21 with a combined population of over two billion. Not surprisingly, the 
combined export market share of this group is significant for most IAFLC crops, most 
notably rice, cassava, groundnuts, and chickpeas. Net group exports of four of these five 
crops2 are positive. 
In Figures 4a and 4b, Brazil is included in the grou~.~ Figure 4a shows - again - 
that for all IARC crops, the vast majority of output is not traded internationally, the most 
extreme case in point being yams - an important crop in terms of output, but negligable in 
terms of international trade. Note that rice group output (in value terms) is vastly larger 
than group output of any other IARC crop. As shown in figure 4b, the only IARC crop 
whose group exports (m value terms) come anywhere close to those of rice is bananas. 
(But, as we noted above, the type of bananas that is usually traded internationally is not an 
IARC research priority.) Moreover, bananas and cassava are the only major export crops 
listed here for which group exports are much larger than group imports. 
Figures 5 and 6 show how world output and world exports, respectively, of some 
major IARC crops are divided among four groups of countries: low-income developing 
countries,24 China, middle-income developing countries,” and the rest of the world.26 
Table 7 provides market share data for the transition economies. Wheat and barley 
are the only major export crops for this group. Wheat exports stand out in value ternis, 
while barley is the only other major crop of which this group is a somewhat significant net 
exporter. Group output of wheat, barley and potatoes is significant relative to world 
output. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 provide market share data for three groups of developed 
countries. Here, we are especially interested in net imports.*’ A measure of net imports is 
” Rice, Wheat, Maize, and Soybeans. 
*I See footnote 11. 
zz Groundnuts being the exception. 
23 Only for Soybeans does this make a significant difference.! 
24 See footnote 10. 
25 Iu Figures 4a, 4b, 5, and 6 Brazil is included in the category “Middle-Income Countries excluding 
China”. 
26 The ‘Rest of the World” category consists of all Developed Countries and Transition Economies. 
!’ 27 Note that if both imports and exports are large, it is likely that a large proportion of group trade is 
intru-group trade. This is especially true in the European Union, which is a geographically contiguous 
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given by subtracting any percentage in the third column from the corresponding 
percentage in the fourth col~mn.~~ Thus, taking into account volume of trade (in value 
terms), we see in Table 8 that the European Union is a significant net importer of maize, 
bananas, groundnuts, soybeans, dry beans, cassava, and sorghum. Interestingly, inspection 
of Table 10 reveals that the category of other developed countries {which excludes the 
U.S.A. and the E.U.) exhibits the exact same pattern. 
Of these crops, maize and sorghum are not significant net export crops of 
developing countries; the United States dominate the international maize and sorghum 
markets. As for groundnuts and dry beans, combining information from Tables 8, 9, and 
10, we see that although U.S. net exports of these crops are substantial, the combined net 
imports of the European Union and other developed countries are much larger. In the case 
of soybeans, the European Union and other developed countries are large net importers, 
while the United States dominate the international market. However, as reported above, 
Brazilian soybean exports are significant. From this data set, it is impossible to tell to what 
extent U.S. exports dominate other developed countries’ import markets. Judging by 
FAOSTAT data, it may be that all of Brazil’s exports go to developed countries, but it 
may also be that a large proportion of Brazil’s exports goes to other middle-income 
developing countries.2g However, it is well known that Brazil is a significant exporter of 
soybeans to developed countries.30 Finally, there is a very clear pattern in international 
cassava trade: cassava is mainly exported by middle-income developing countries 
(excluding Brazil and China) to the European Union. The international cassava market is 
of intermediate size.31 
Table 9 shows that the United States are a major net importer of bananas, plantains 
and yams. In these crops, international trade is clearly dominated by the category of 
middle-income developing countries, as can be seen in Table 6. As shown in Table 1, the 
international (predominantly non&ARC varieties) banana market is big, while international 
markets for plantains and yams are small. 
We conclude our discussion of the tables and graphs with a few comments on rice. 
Rice is not only the world’s most important crop in terms of output, but also the number 
one IARC crop in terms of developing countries’ exports (see Table 6). However, most of 
these exports probably go to other developing countries (see also Table 3). Due to the 
lack of bilateral trade data in FAOSTAT, we are unable to quantify South-North rice trade 
here. From Table 8 we can infer that imports of the European Union’s member countries 
trading block. For example, most Potato trade of member countries of the European Union is with other 
member countries. The reader is also remiuded that the last cohrmn of Table 1 provides information 
about aggregate net imports of all developed countries. 
28 The reader is reminded that we adjusted the raw imports data so that, by construction, aggregate world 
imports equal aggregate world exports. 
29 We currently do not have this information because FAOSTAT does not provide bilateral trade data. 
3o In the early 197Os, Brazil quickly established itself as a Soybean exporter to Japan and the European 
Union. One should always keep in mind that markets are dynamic. In the future, other challenges to 
currently dominant crop exporters will no doubt arise. 
31 As Table 1 shows, world exports total a little over half a billion U.S. dollars. 
Appendix C-3 - E. Binenbaum and B. Wright. On the Significance of South-North 
Trade in IARC Crops - Page 8 - 
from non-member countries comprise between 2.7% and 7.9% of world imports. Because 
U.S. net rice exports total 12.7% of world exports, a large proportion of E.U. imports 
may well be supplied by U.S. exporters. But we cannot exclude the possibility that total 
rice exports from developing to developed countries are signiflcant.32 - 
4. Conclusions 
It should be emphasized that the database used for this report, FAOSTAT, has 
some major limitations and flaws, the most important of which is its lack of bilateral trade 
data.33 Nevertheless, (mainly) on the basis of FAOSTAT it is possible to draw some 
conclusions regarding the importance of South-North trade in IABC crops. 
Of most IARC crops, only small percentages of world output are traded- 
internationally. Notably, rice is perhaps the most important crop in the wo:rld, but only a 
small fraction of rice output is traded intemationally.34 
IARC crops exhibiting significant South-North trade flows include soybeans, d.ry 
beans, groundnuts, cassava, plantains, and yams, and perhaps rice35. Among these, rice 
and soybeans are the only crops whose international markets are very large36 relative to 
those of other crops. International trade in dry beans, groundnuts, and cassava is also 
sizeable. Dry beans are the only IARC crop for which exports from the poorest categaq 
of countries - the low-income developing countries - are noteworthy. Finally, plantains 
and yams are mostly exported from middle-income developing countries to developled 
countries, but these international markets are small.38 
The recent trade patterns reported here have one clear implication. The poorest 
countries are unlikely to be greatly exposed in the near term to accusations of intellectual 
property rights violations by their exports of IARC crops to the North. 
For middle-income countries, problems might occur in some of the seven crops 
listed above. Investment in bilateral trade data might provide a more accurate picture of 
their potential exposure. We suggest that the Expert Panel consider the feasibility of 
32 Based on FAOSTAT, South-North Rice trade cannot exceed one billion U.S. dollars, and is likely to be 
substantially less and to comprise a number of distinct varieties. 
33 The currently available budget for this research project does not permit the purchase of COMTFLABE, 
which is a data set offered by the United Nations Statistics Division. COMTRAJIE does provide 
bilateral trade data. 
, 34 Even so, Rice is the number four IARC crop in terms of value of world exports. 
35 Bananas are not included in this listing, because dessert bananas are not a major focus of IARC 
research. The international market for dessert bananas is very large and clearly dominated by exports 
from developing countries. 
36Total world trade in both Rice and Soybeans exceeds seven billion U.S. dollars. Due to the lack of 
bilateral trade data in FAOSTAT, we are currently unable to exactly quantify South-North tradeflows of 
-soybeaIls and Rice. 
37 That is, between half a billion and one-and-half-billion U.S. dollars. 
38 That is, less than one hundred million U.S. dollars. 
Appendix C-3 - E. Binenbaum and B. Wright. On the Significance of South-North 
Trade in IARC Crops - Page 9 
estimating threshold values for exports to the North below which serious exposure to 
intellectual property challenges is unlikely. 
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Table 1: Indicators of Importance of Trade, 1995 (Values in US $1 ,OOO,OOO) 
Note that non-/ARC crops appearing in this table are italicized. 
WHEAT 
Value of Value of Output 
Value of World Output World Exports/ of Developing* 



























COW PEAS, DRY 
PIGEON PEAS 
16,564 91,096 18.2% 42,766 
12,209 16,960 72.0% 16,954 
10,829 71,410 15.2% 34,820 
7,392 29,282 25.2% 14,593 
7,297 179,858 4.1% 171,495 
4,620 19,820 23.3% 19,510 
2,669 20,220 13.2% 3,884 
2,459 3,958 62.1% 3,958 
2,273 91,718 2.5% 32,913 
2,267 5,093 44.5% 4,811 
1,943 57,097 3.4% 17,639 
1,256 9,031 13.9% 7,830 
1,033 22,435 4.6% 21,044 
839 6,891 12.2% 5,144 
638 22,492 2.8% 22,492 
297 18,762 1.6% 18,692 
280 1,277 21.9% 1,023 
248 7,256 3.4% 6,973 
192 4,095 4.7% 2,682 
102 736 13.9% 736 
67 14,351 0.5% 14,351 
57 5,956 1.0% 5,712 
34 37,647 0.1% 37,116 
21 25,575 0.1% 25,414 
5 533 0.9% 524 

























cm ?% “V.” I” 
100.0% 
l See footnotes 11, 12, 14, and 15 for definitions of the Developed and Developing categories. 
l * Production data are for Coffee, Green; Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts in Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Coffee, Green and Roast; Rice (Tn!a!); Groundnuts, She!!ed nrl~r crnllnAn**b- I- ruuv V~VU~ VUI IUIS 11 I Shell; Sid [3ilSd CEaSsava. 
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Table 2: indicators of Importance of Trade (crops are sorted by IARCs*), 1995 


























7,297 179,858 4.1% 171,495 
1,256 ,9,031 13.9% 7,830 
638 22,492 2.8% 22,492 
192 4,095 4.7% 2,682 
16,564 91,096 18.2% 42,766 
10,829 71,410 15.2% 34,820 
2,669 20,220 13.2% 3,884 
2,273 91,718 2.5% 32,913 
34 37,647 0.1% 37,116 
16,564 91,096 18.2% 42,766 
2,669 20,220 13.2% 3,884 
1,256 9,031 13.9% 7,830 
248 7,256 3.4% 6,973 
192 4,095 4.7% 2,682 
Value of 
World Output 
(at exoort orices) 
Value of Output 
World Exports/ of Developing** 




































* IARCs (International Agricultural Research Centers) are in alphabetical order; crops for each IARC are ranked by Value of World Exports 
l * See footnotes 11, 12, 14 and 15 for definitions of the Developed and Developing categories. 
l ** Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts in Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. 
. . . and B. Wmht. On the Slgnlficance of South-North Trade ULURC C r - ODS Pane 12 
Table 2 (continued): Indicators of Importance of Trade (crops are sorted by IARCs*), 1995 
(Values in US $1,600,000) 
Research 
Center 
Value of Value of Output 
Value of World Output World Exports/ of Developing** 




ICRISAT GROUNDNUTS*** 1,033 22,435 4.6% 21,044 
(India) SORGHUM 839 6,891 12.2% 5,144 
CHICK-PEAS 248 7,256 3.4% 6,973 
MILLET 57 5,956 1.0% 5,712 






IITA MAIZE 10,829 71,410 15.2% 34,820 48.8% 
(Nigeria) SOYBEANS 7,392 29,282 25.2% 14,593 49.8% 
RICE*** 7,297 179,858 4.1% 171,495 95.4% 
BANANAS**** 4,620 19,820 23.3% 19,510 98.4% 
CASSAVA**” 638 22,492 2.8% 22,492 100.0% 
YAMS 21 25,575 0.1% 25,414 99.4% 
COW PEAS, DRY 5 533 0.9% 524 98.3% 
IPGRlllNlBAP BANANAS**** 4,620 19,820 23.3% 19,510 
(France) 
98.4% 























* IARCs (International Agricultural Research Centers) are in alphabetical order; crops for each IARC are ranked by Value of World Exports I ’ 
** See footnotes 11, 12, 14 and 15 for definitions of the Developed and Developing categories. 
*** Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts in Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. 
**** The FAOSTAT database does not distinguish between cooking bananas and dessert bananas. IARC banana research focuses on cooking bananas 
which are predominantly for local consumption, rather than the dessert bananas that are traded internationally in large quantities, 














Group Exports Group Exports 












































l For a listing of countries in Low-Income Developing category, see footnote 11. 
l * Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts In Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. ’ 
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Domestic Exports Domestic Exports Domestic Exports I Domestic Imports I Domestic Output I 
w $1 .OOQ per capita World Exnorts World Imports World Outwt 
770,426 $4.84 10.9% 2.6% 20.3% 
5,315 0.03 0.0% 1.7% 7.1% 
3,907 0.02 0.1% 0.0% 10.3% 
1,310 0.01 5.9% 0.0% 0.7% 
1,016 0.01 0.0% 9.1% 16.3% 
16 0 0.0% 6.0% 0.3% 
0 0 0.0% 0.0% 15.4% 
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Domestic Exports Domestic Exports / Domestic Imports / Domestic Output 1 Domestic Consumption / 
per capita World Exports World World Output World Outrx~t 
$0.22 26.5% 2.0% 7.8% 4.4% 
0.21 24.9% 0.1% 35.8% 34.5% 
0.08 1.2% 8.6% 10.7% 12.6% 
0.05 1 .O% 7.7% 33.9% 34.2% 
0.03 ,0.3% 1.2% 
0.01 0.1% 15.2% 
0.01 1.5% 0.5% 
0.01 7.4% 0.2% 
0.01 34.5% 0.0% 
0 * 0.4% 0.0% 
0 7.2% 0.9% 
0 0.0% 12.4% 
0 0.0% 6.9% 3.2% 4.2% 





86.4% . 86.4% 
16.0% 16.0% 
11.8% 11.7% 
18.8% 21.1% ’ I ’ 
l Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts In Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. 
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Table 5b: Chinese Trade in Wheat and Rice, 19864995 











570 51,233 211,264 
748 83,110 220,404 
885 76,184 204,199 
239 305,076 111,574 
559 12,755 97,990 
265 40,987 181,784 
298 40,317 232,897 
8,238 36,628 266,222 
10,055 143,490 533,138 
1,559 435,273 56,486 
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SWEET .POTATOES 6,859 
COW PEAS, DRY 26 
PIGEON PEAS 18 
Group Exports 
w $1 .ow 
Group Exports 
aer 










































l For a listing of countries in Middle-Income Developing category, see footnote 12. 
l * Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts In Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. 











































Table 7: Market Share Data for Transition Economies*, 1995 ’ 
Group Output / 
World Output 
Group Exports Group Exports Group Exports I Group Imports / 
w $1 .OOOl per capita World Fxports World! 
WHEAT 1,211,517 $2.92 9.8% 6.8% 
BARLEY 292,452 0.71 18.7% 10.0% 
MAIZE 188,813 0.46 1.3% 1.4% 
POTATOES 71,249 0.17 5.3% 7.2% 
BANANAS 47,417 0.11 0.8% 10.8% 
MILLET 8,054 0.02 18.4% 1.6% 
GROUNDNUTS** 2,055 0 0.2% 5.1% 
* For a listing of countries in Transition Economies category, see footnote 13. 
** Production data are for Groundnuts In Shell; trade data are for Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell. 
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w $1 .ow 
Group Exports 
per capita 




































l For a listing of member countries of the European Union, see footnote 14. 
** Production data are for Rice, Paddy; Groundnuts In Shell; and Cassava. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total); Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell; and Dried Cassava. 


































6.7% ’ ’ 
0.1% 
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Table 9: Market Share Data for the USA, 1995 
MAIZE 7,534,947 $28.21 
WHEAT 5,457,780 20.43 
SOYBEANS 5,427,678 20.32 
RICE* 996,530 3.73 
SORGHUM 682,105 2.55 
GROUNDNUTS* 221,274 0.83 
BEANS, DRY 212,817 0.8 
BANANAS 200,954 0.75 
BARLEY 178,142 0.67 
POTATOES 83,172 0.31 
LENTILS 38,919 0.15 
MILLET 11,005 0.04 
SWEET POTATOES 8,000 0.03 
COW PEAS, DRY 1,438 0.01 
PLANTAINS 0 0 
YAMS 0 0 
Domestic Exports 
(US $1 .OOO) 
Domestic Exports Domestic Exports / Domestic Imports I 





































































* Production data are for Rice, Paddy and for Groundnuts In Shell. 
Trade data are for Rice (Total) and for Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell. 














Group Exports Group Exports 



























































Table IO: Market Share Data for Rest of Developed Economies* (excluding USA and European Union), 1995 















l For a listing of countries in the Rest-of-Developed category, see footnote 15. 
** Production data are for Groundnuts in Shell; trade data are for Groundnuts, Shelled plus Groundnuts In Shell. 
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[Figure 3a] Production and Trade (China), 1995 
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[Figure 3c] Fluctuation of Chinese Trade in Wheat and Rice 
Exports (Wheat) 




menbaumd B. Wrght. On the Simificance of South-North Trade in IARC Cram - Page 29 
















and B. Wneht. 
. . 
On the Swnlficance of South-North Trade m IARC Croos - Page 3Q 









e of South-North Trade m QlIRC 



















CLODS - Paue 32 
and B. Wighi. 
. . 
On the S-e of South-Nmtb Trade ilnIARC 

















APPENDIX D - BACKGROUND PAPERS 
Appendix D-l - Guiding Principles for the CGIAR Centers on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources - Page 1 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE CGIAR CENTERS ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GENETIC RESOURCES 
BACKGROUND 
The CGIAR is committed to the conservation and use of genetic resources in 
an expeditious, cost-effective and equitable manner. In recent years the CGIAR’s 
activities have been increasingly conditioned by a rapidly changing intellectual 
property rights environment, the issue of Farmers’ Rights and the growing 
importance of the private sector. In this context the CGLAR, at its Mid-Term 
Meeting, Istanbul in May 1992, agreed on a set of working principles on genetic 
resources and intellectual property. These were published in the proceedings of the 
meeting and were largely based on a set of guiding principles on plant genetic 
resources and related intellectual property rights issues adopted by the International 
Agricultural Research Centers in 1991. 
Significant changes have occurred since the CGIAR decisions in 1992 that affect the 
exchange and use of genetic resources: 
0 The Convention on Biological Dive&y came into force 29 December 
1993; 
0 Centers signed agreements with FAO on 26 October 1994, bringing 
their germplasm collections under the auspices of FAO, as part of the 
International Network of Ex Situ Collections. Materials covered in 
these agreements referred to as “designated germplasm”2, are listed in 
the appendices to the agreements. 
l The Multilateral Trade Agreement which came into force 1 January 
1995 embodies provisions on Trade Related Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS). As a result, many counties are now developing and enacting 
intellectual property rights legislation, including plant variety 
protection. 
Against this background, the CGIAR convened a panel on intellectual property 
rights in September 1994 under the Chairmanship of Dr. M.S. Swaminathan. The 
report of the panel was endorsed at International Centers Week in October 1994. 
Based on the agreed recommendations made in this report and, pending the 
emergence of international consensus on a range of issues arising, the CGIAR 
Centers have revised their guiding principles on intellectual property. While it is 
1 This paper was adopted as an interim working paper by the CGIAR at its ICW’% meeting, 
Washington, D.C. 19%. 
2 The majority of materials currently held in Center genebsnks has already been designated as 
coming under the agreement with FAO. Further material is being designated (as stocks are cleaned 
and multiplied) with the result that only those materials carrying special conditions imposed by the 
supplier would remain undesignated. (In 19%, such material accounts for less than 5 percent of the 
total holdings.) 
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envisaged that there may well be further revisions as changing circumstances 
warrant, the Centers consider it essential to clearly state these guiding principles for 
the benefit of the NARSs, donors, NGOs, the private sector and our other partners in 
research and development 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
1. The germplasm designated by the Centers is held in trust for the world 
community in accordance with the agreements signed with FAO. Through the 
agreements, official inter-governmental recognition is given to this role of the 
Centers, and FAO is to provide policy advice to the Centers in the execution of their 
responsibilities. The Centers agree to conserve, maintain, study, improve, and 
distribute germplasm world-wide for use in agricultural research and devel$ol%ment 
As trustees of the designated germplasm, the Centers also affirm their respo:nsibility 
for safe and secure conservation of these genetic materials for present and future 
generations, including their duplication in at least one other location for safety. 
2. Through their guiding principles on intellectual property protection, the Centers 
aim to promote ready access to both the designated germplasm and the Centers’ 
research products, including biotechnological processes arising from their research. 
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
3. The Centers recognize that the acquisition of germplasm after the coming into 
force of the Convention on the Biological Diversity is subject to the provisions of the 
said Convention, and in particular to the sovereign rights of states over their genetic 
resources. The Centers wiIl strive to reach an understanding on mutually agreed 
terms with national governments, either individually or collectively, facilitating the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the collection, conservation and 
utilization of such germplasm, besides providing ready access to these genetic 
resources. 
FARMERS’ RIGHTS 
4. The Centers recognize the contributions of farming and indigenous communities 
to genetic resources conservation and enhancement In order to convert this concept 
into reality the Centers are prepared to contribute to national and international 
efforts to develop appropriate policies and procedures for the recognition of 
Farmers’ Eights. The Centers also recognize the expertise of m.any national and 
international NGOs on equity, gender, conservation and sustainability issues and 
where appropriate partnerships with them and others in order to integrate these 
concerns in research on genetic resources conservation and use. 
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION - DESIGNATED GERMI’LASM AND 
CENTER RESEARCH PRODUCTS 
5. The Centers will not claim legal ownership nor apply intellectual property 
protection to the germplasm they hold in trust, and will require recipients of the 
germplasm to observe the same conditions, in accordance with the agreements 
s.igned with FAO. 
6. Plant Breeders’ Rights. Materials supplied by the Centers, whether designated 
germplasm or the products of the Centers’ breeding activities, may be used by 
recipients for breeding purposes without restriction. Recipients, including the 
private sector, may protect the products of such breeding through plant variety 
protection that is consistent with the provisions of UPOV or any other sui germis 
system, and that does not preclude others from using the original materials in their 
own breeding programs. 
7. Defensive Protection by Centers. Based on the conviction that their research 
will continue to be supported by public funds, the Centers regard the results of their 
work as international public goods. Hence full disclosure of research results and 
products in the public domain is the preferred strategy for preventing 
misappropriation by others. Consequently, the Centers will not assert intellectual 
property control over derivatives except in those rare cases when this is needed to 
facilitate technology transfer or otherwise protect the interests of developing 
nations. In all such cases, the Centers will disclose the reasons for seeking 
protection. 
8. The Centers do not see the protection of intellectual property as a mechanism for 
securing financial returns for their germplasm research activities, and will not view 
potential returns as a source of operating funds. In the event that a Center secures 
financial returns as a result of the commercialization by others of its protected 
property, appropriate means will be used to ensure that such funds are used for 
furthering the mandate of the Center and the objectives of the CGIAR. 
9. Any intellectual property protection of Centers’ output will be done on behalf of 
the Centers and not individual scientists. All staff in the Centers will be required to 
disclose innovations and assign all rights on these to the Centers. 
10. Patenting. We recognize that there is an increasing use of patenting in both the 
private and public sectors. Cells, organelles, genes or molecular constructs isolated 
from materials distributed by Centers may be protected by recipients only with the 
agreement of the supplying Center. Centers will only give such approval after 
consultation with the country, or countries, of origin of the germplasm where this is 
known or can be readily identified. This consultation would include consideration 
of an appropriate sharing of any benefits, whether bilateral or multilateral, flowing 
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from subsequent commercial development of the protected maiterial.3, and would 
require that the original material remains available for the public ,good. 
11. Center Access to Material Protected by Others. To promote-the availa.bility to 
developing nations of germplasm and scientific innovations that have been 
protected by others, the Centers may enter into agreements with the holders of such 
rights. Acceptance of any limitations on the distribution and use of derived and 
associated materials would have to be consistent with the goals and objectives of the 
CGIAR, and the benefits of such agreements should outweigh the potential 
disadvantages. 
BIOSAFETY 
12. The Centers will continue to give overriding importance to biosafety concerns 
and will follow collaborating country guidelines concerning biosa:fety. 
GENERAL PROCEDURES 
13. These Guiding PMciples will be reviewed at regular intervals and revised as 
need be in the light of international developments. This revision -will be carried out 
by the Center Directors Committee. 
14. The Centers will adopt specific policies for the distribution and use of improved 
germplasm and biotechnological products following the above Guiding Principles. 
3 It is recognized that this requirement for the granting of permission by a Center before a recipient 
can w out patent protection represents a sign&ant departure from the current position in which 
the Centers do not require any such permission. While this is not spedcally required under the 
terms of the agreements signed with FAO, nevertheless the CGIAR feels that such a requirement is 
needed both to protect the interests of countries of origin and to bring CGIAR policy in line wih the 
spirit of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). While the CGIAR Centers can not themselves 
be party to the Convention, it is nevertheless recognized that the majority of CGIAR members and 
partner countries have signed and ratified the CBD. 
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Calestous Juma. Comments on the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and IPR 
Below are preliminary comments arising from the discussions and deliberations in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity regarding the Panel’s Subgroup I (Protecting 
CGIAR’s Il?) and Subgroup VI (Other Questions), which will be preceded by a 
general comment. 
General comments: 
1. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are mentioned in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in Article 16. While Article 16 provides for a balance 
between the protection/recognition of existing IPR and the transfer of technology 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity as well as for 
technology related to genetic resources provided by countries of origin, the key 
provision related to impacts of IPRs on the Convention is Article 16 para. 5. It 
stipulates that IPRs should promote and not run counter to the objectives of the 
Convention. The objectives are conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use 
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use 
of genetic resources. 
2. II% have been discussed at various meetings of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) and its subsidiary body. So far, no formal discussion has taken place and no 
decision reached yet about the impacts of IPRs on the objectives of the Convention. 
With respect to access to genetic resources and benefit sharing, there is a feeling that 
existing IPRs and its instruments, licensing and royalties, might be used to share 
benefits. As there is a wide range of views within the COP concerning the impact of 
IPRs, Decision III/17 of the third meeting of the COP called for case studies on the 
impact of IPRs on the objectives of the Convention. However, and as usual in the 
mid-term of the intersessional period, only a few case studies have been 
communicated to the Secretariat yet 
3. The COP pays special attention to discussions in other fora concerning II%. 
The Secretariat has therefore asked for and been granted observer status to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment of WTO and is seeking observer status to the 
TRIPS Council of WTO. The COP wants to be kept informed about the recent 
developments in the protection of databases which have been initiated within WIPO. 
4. Regarding the CGIAR system one could say that there is a similar concern 
within the forum of the CBD regarding IPRs as there is uncertainty on how IPRs will 
impact on the objectives of the Convention. 
5. Another aspect within the CBD regarding IPRs - apart from the existing 
intellectual property rights and especially patents and plant breeders rights - are the 
discussions related to the protection of knowledge, innovations and practices related 
to indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for 
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the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity (Article 8 (j) of the 
Convention). There is a strong feeling from one part of the stakeholders within the 
CBD that there is a need to develop a sui generi3 system of protection as the current 
IPRs are covering sufficiently neither the approval of the holders of that knowledge 
nor the sharing of benefits with them. 
6. The report of a recent Workshop on Traditional Knowledge and Biolofi&l 
fr Diversi% held in Madrid om 23 to 28 November 1997, as an intersessional activity 
by the COP, lists a whole range of options related to FRs and a sui generis system to 
be considered by the COP to implementing Article 8 (j) (similar discussions a:re 
currently carried out within IPGRI regarding a sui gentis system for landraces as an 
alternative to plant breeders rights). It also provides a list of options regarding 
participation of indigenous and local communities which is felt to .be necessary when 
dealing with issues related to those major groups. Traditional knowledge and the 
implementation of Article 8 (j) will be further considered at the next COP in 
Brat&lava, Slovakia, in May 1998. 
7. Regarding material collected by the Centers and the sharing of benefit with the 
holders of the knowledge, it is not clear in which way the Centers are respecting the 
provisions of the Convention. Although IPGRI is currently doing research in the 
field of sui generis systems of protection, the CGIAR Centers might wish to adopt 
some interim policy regarding that issue. This is also true for material collected on 
the land/territory of indigenous and local communities. This is related to the CGIAR 
proprietary science, as a slice of that science might be due to the input of local. and 
indigenous communities and the relationship of the CGIAR proprietary science to 
those groups and holders of knowledge has not been clarified. 
8. It is not clear yet how benefit sharing by the Centers works with those 
communities. It is true that the Centers share benefits as they distribute germplasm 
widely to the NARs and to those approaching the Centers, but it is unclear how it 
reaches those in concrefo who have been provided the genetic resources. 
9. Protection of proprietary science might be a way to generate benefits which 
could be distributed to those having provided genetic resources and knowledge 
in the first place. As those will be most likely small scale farmers or indigenous 
peoples (who might be partly identical with farmers), legal protection might 
provide for incentives to continue to use traditional varieties or provide for some 
poverty alleviation. 
10. The responsibilities of the Centres under the implementation of the 
Biodiversity Convention depend on the specifications by the COP and its subsidiary 
organs to the access and benefit sharing regime the Convention is 
setting up. So far, prior informed consent (approval of the holder of the knowledge) 
and mutually agreed terms which have to include some form of be:nefit sharing are 
qualifiers to access to genetic resources which has been legally unregulated on the 
international level before the entry into force of the Convention. The CG Centers 
could play a leading role in providing best practice how to handle .those qualifiers 
without (yet) existing internationally binding laws or guidelines. Responsibilities 
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might be set up by the COP over time; the deliberations within the CGRFA on the 
International Undertaking are closely interlinked with the negotiations under the 
Convention. 
11. The CGIAR could play a leading role in providing best practice on access 
and benefit sharing as ex-situ collections. It can provide expertise-how to best 
handle negotiations on access and benefit sharing arrangements and transfer 
agreements. This could provide useful information for other areas of genetic 
resources use which are not related to food and agriculture. 
12. Policies that should be put forward are ‘those which are promoting conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, protecting indigenous 
and local knowledge and promoting traditional lifestyles. Serious thought should 
be given to a legal protection of the knowledge which is both effective and - 
practicable. 
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Bernard le Buanec. Plant breeders’ rights and fartgers’ rights - A 
complex debate 
The debate on plant breeders’ rights and on farmers’ rights has been going on 
now for 20 years. It started at FAO in 1979 and resulted, in 1989, in the international 
recognition of farmers’ rights by Resolution (5/89), defining them as “rights arising 
from the past, present and future contributions in conserving, improving and 
making available Plant Genetic Resources (PGR’s), particularly those in the Centres 
of origin/ diversity . . . ‘I. The Convention on Biological Diversity confirms this 
definition and since 1993, many lively debates have taken place at the international 
level on the definition of farmers’ rights and on the necessary balance between these 
rights and those of plant breeders. Many authors consider these two rights 
incompatible, presenting arguments showing a substantial lack of knowledge of the 
plant breeders’ rights system based on the UPOV Convention. 
To allow an efficient debate, it is thus important to start with good 
premises and to make clear what are plant breeders’ rights, which are 
intellectual property rights officialized through the 1961 UPOV Convention. This 
Convention was revised in 1972,1978 and 1991. 
The UPOV Convention grants the breeder of a new, distinct, homogeneous 
and stable variety an exclusive right, limited in time (15 to 20 years), to exploit that 
variety for seed multiplication purposes. This right applies only to a new variety, 
hence ,to an improvement in comparison with other existing varieties, and not to the 
genome of the species as a whole. In no case does the plant breeders’ right block 
access to a species for production or breeding purposes. 
Why should the protected variety be distinct, homogeneous and stable? This 
is not at all for agronomic reasons but simply for the purpose of practical 
implementation of the right. Indeed, to implement the right, the protected object 
should be recognizable (distinction and homogeneity) and stable over time. In 
particular, homogeneity is not a characteristic sought for itself, even though the 
tendencies of some official bodies are moving in that direction. Furthermore, the 
homogeneity required by UPOV is relative, as confirmed by Article 8 of the 
Convention: “The variety shall be deemed to be uniform if, subject to the variation 
that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently 
uniform in its relevant characteristics.” 
The UPOV Convention also provides for exceptions to plant breeders’ rights 
(Article 15): 
. compulsory exceptions to be implemented by all UPOV member 
countries for: 
acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; 
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acts done for experimental purposes; 
acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties and for the 
production and commercialization of such other varieties. 
an optional exception, formerly known as farmers’ p:rMlege 
(not to be confused with the concept of farmers’ rights 
mentioned above) and now called farm-saved seed: “Each 
contracting party may, within reasonable limits and subject to 
safeguarding of the legitimate interest of the breeder, restrict the 
breeders’ right in relation to any other variety in order to permit 
farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, 
the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, 
on their own holdings, the protected variety . ..‘I . 
Hence, plant breeders’ rights defined through the UPOV Convention are very 
flexible, as they do not apply to subsistence farmers who would be 
interested in using modern varieties, they allow for derogations on a 
national or regional basis (European Union, Andean Pact) for the use of 
farm-saved seed and, finally, they permit free access to all protected 
varieties for breeding purposes. 
Are breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights incompatible? 
This question is difficult to answer in a general way because, although the 
definition of farmers’ rights was adopted eight years ago, it was drafted in 
such a vague manner that, in spite of days and days of debates within 
international instances over the years, no agreement has yet been reached as to its 
content 
Some consider farmers’ rights as the right to continue to dispose of 
sufficient genetic variability, to do their own breeding work and to use 
freely seeds harvested on their own holdings. 
If one admits this interpretation, then, are these rights incompatible with 
plant breeders’ rights? 
. Availability of sufficient genetic variability: Even though there are 
improved varieties on the market, farmers may still continue using land 
races they have used for generations, if they so wish. The availability of 
improved varieties simply widens the variability at their disposal. However, the 
tendency to use improved varieties, if they show advantages, is to be noted. 
Nevertheless, there is no link between the possible decrease of variability and\ plant 
breeders’ rights. The fact that a variety is private or public has no influence on 
biological diversity whatsoever. It can even be confirmed, without a major risk of 
error, that plant breeders’ rights favour diversity by: 
better controlling dissemination of improved varieties; 
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allowing competition between breeders and thus the availability 
of more varieties; 
preventing commercialization of “almost identical” varieties, by 
implementing the concept of essentially derived varie-ties. 
This view is also held by the majority of or even all OECD countries at 
intema.tional meetings. 
. Right to continue to do their own breeding work: Assuming that a large 
number of farmers are crossing varieties for breeding purposes, which is most 
unlikely, there is no provision in the UPOV Convention to prevent them from doing 
so, even using protected varieties. Nor are they prevented from freely using the new 
varieties obtained. In addition, if these new varieties are distinct, sufficiently 
homogeneous and stable (this is a question of common sense, otherwise how can 
they be recognized?), an application could be made for their protection. 
. Free use of seeds harvested on their own holdings: As far as the poorest 
farmers in the least developed countries, i.e. subsistence farmers, are concerned, we 
have already seen that they are exempt from breeders’ rights defined by the LTPOV 
Convention. As to farmers integrated in a commercial chain, each country may, 
accord.ing to its economic and social situation, take special dispositions authorizing 
the use of farm-saved seed on a case-by-case basis, if appropriate. The only absolute 
restriction is the prohibition of selling farm-saved seed, which is not within the 
normal activities of a farmer, especially of a subsistence farmer. 
If one admits the interpretation of farmers’ rights as presented above, 
there is no incompatibility with plant breeders’ rights and thus no need to modify 
plant breeders’ rights in order to implement farmers’ rights at the national level. 
Contrary interpretations are probably based on an erroneous analysis of the UPOV 
Convention, even in its 1991 version. 
Farmers’ rights are considered as a new intellectual property right yet to be 
defined. Nobody is currently in a position to state whether or not they 
are compatible with plant breeders’ rights. Such rights, if their object were 
genetic resources, would certainly be complex because the owner would not be 
known precisely, the objects would be difficult to identify and, to be meaningful, 
those rights should be of very long or even undetermined duration, which is 
contrary to the current principles of intellectual property rights. They should not 
result in freezing the exchange of genetic resources for food and agriculture because 
their effect would be opposite to their initial aim. 
Finally, some consider that farmers’ rights should lead to the establishment of 
a fund. (national level? global level?) aimed at improving conservation and use of 
biological diversity or even at financing development programmes. Nor is this 
.incompatible with breeders’ rights. However, one should be careful about perverse 
solutions that seem simple. In particular, proposals have sometimes been made to 
finance such a fund through taxes on commercial seeds. In this, there is nothing 
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incompatible with plant breeders’ rights. Nevertheless, this is paradoxical because if 
there were taxes on seeds, it would be the farmers themselves who would finally 
finance the fund deriving from their rights. Furthermore, such an approach .wou.ld 
have a perverse effect: it would favour the use of farm-saved seed,, often of bad 
quality, to the detriment of professional seed, which is contrary to the wishes of 
many governments of developing countries. 
Plant Breeding and the IARCs 
1. As regards plant breeding, the situation of the CGIAR is not unique. 
The success of plant breeding at the world level, should it be public or private, 
has resulted from the free exchange of genetic diversity, new technology and 
information. The entry into force of the UPOV convention, first in developed 
countries, has not changed that situation, due to the breeders’ exception. The 
adoption of the UPOV convention or of a Sui Generis System requested by the TRIP’s 
agreement, possibly shaped on the UPOV convention, by developjig countries, 
won’t change the situation. We have of course to insist on the necessity to have a 
breeders’ exception like system in any sui gene+ system. The following developing 
countries are now members of the UPOV convention : Argentina, Chile, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, South Africa, Uruguay. Brazil has lod.ged an application 
for membership. Discussions are going on with India and China and probably other 
countries. Countries in transition, such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, are also members of UPOV. 
Two main changes have occurred, impacting on plant breeding and free exchange of 
germplasm : 
. The development of molecular markers and genetic engineering tools since 
the early 1980’s. Those tools are becoming essential and will be absolutely essential 
for plant breeding (and animal breeding) in the years to come. 
The possibility of patenting biotechnological inventions could impact 
negatively on the free exchange of germplasm, even for research purposes, at least in 
some countries. 
. The signing of the CBD in 1992, in which the concept of X< Plant Genetic 
Resources being a common heritage of mankind to be preserved and freely available 
for use, “for the benefit of present and future generations” is replaced by the 
affirmation that “States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources”. 
The FAO Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture hasagreed 
that the “International Undertaking should be revised to be in harmony with the 
CBD”. Even if that concept is perfectly acceptable, it has, at least as far as agriculture 
is concerned, perverse effects. (Some members of our panel indicatted in our 
Washington meeting that the consequences were becoming disastrous for 
developing countries). 
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2. In developing countries most of the seed used is “farm saved seed”. It is now 
generally agreed that, due to that situation, the seed used has bad or very bad 
quality with a very negative impact on agricultural productivity and food supply. 
Many developing countries, encouraged by the World Bank and other international 
organizations are trying to develop a seed production and distribution network 
(formal or informal. But if it is informally organized, is it still informal and will it 
improve the situation? In that process many developing countries, still encouraged 
by the World Bank, are trying to develop a private seed sector. 
3. If we want to, as far as possible, get away from criticism, we should avoid 
presenting our action as a defence of the CGIAR System, which, as such, would not 
be justified, but rather as a defence of the improvement of agriculture and food 
supply in developing countries. 
4. Over the last thirty years the CGIAR System has been very successful, 
due to the fact that its institutional structure was well adapted to the 
global environment The technical environment is evolving and has changed 
dramatically the last 10 years. We should avoid nostalgia for the old good times. As 
indicated by the panel, ” radical change in the environment may require 
corresponding radical change in the CGIAR”. 
Conclusions -- 
In order to address properly the issue of Proprietary science of others we need : 
. Either a joint meeting with the panel of scientists or a written 
document from them. 
. A survey regarding question Gl and G2. 
. A consultation on the effect of patented genes / process of export of 
commodities. 
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Timothy Roberts. Market Segmentation 
01, Price Price/Volume curve 
The diagram illustrates the importance of market segmentation to a commercial 
innovator. A hypothetical price/volume curve for a genetically modified seed is shown. 
An #owner of technology develops a new genetically motied seed. His marginal cost 
of production is c, at which price he can sell C bags, for a total return of $Cc. 
However, at this price he would not recover any of the fixed costs of doing research 
and development, including proving safety. To cover all sunk costs, he has to price 
instead at b, selling B bags, for a total return of $Bb. If competition prevents him 
selling at b, he will go out of business (or at least not make any further investment in 
innovation). He may be able to improve his return further, for example by selling A 
bags at price a, to recover au extra $A(a-b) of profit. A non-discriminating monopolist 
would do this, if marginal revenue equals marginal cost at output A. The producer can 
without affecting the bottom line sell some material at his marginal cost c to third 
parties (e.g. peasant farmers) with no capacity to pay the commercial (developed 
country) price or to compete in commercial markets. This results in sales of the 
technology to (or at least use by) some of those who want or need it but are too poor 
to be prospective commercial clients. If on the other hand the poor farmers with the 
new technology have access to commercial markets, so that they can undercut 
commercial sales the company would otherwise profit from, the company is of course 
damaged. 
Sales below marginal cost c cost the company more than they earn and indicate 
unlikely philanthropy on the part of the corporation or its executives. However, it may 
be possible to license material for use: at a marginal cost to the licenser that is either 
negligible -or very much smaller than the hcensor’s cost of production. This might 
make the product available to poor users at a cost to them as low as d. 
In this way, the innovation can become available to more and poorer people - very 
much more than if the product can only be sold at b. Of course, people who buy at 
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price a lose out - at the hands of the producer, who pockets an extra (al-b) for each 
bag they buy. As against this, D-B units go to poorer people who would not otherwise 
have access to the innovation. Apart from the producer, those who lose are the better 
off, and those who gain are the poor, including the very poor: so this seems to be a _ 
situation that the CGIAR should encourage. 
However, to repeat, this will not happen unless markets can be segmented. If the 
producer licenses in open markets, prices will reduce through competition to between 
c and d. The producer will lose heavily - and be unwilling to license technology in 
future. 
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Miguel Altieri. Third World Farmers and IPR 
Despite the approval of the more restrictive 1991 UPOV Convention that 
makes plant breeders’ rights more like patent protection and limits the right of 
farmers to trade protected seeds with their neighbors, farmers organizations and 
NGOs have maintained the basic assumption that the CGIAR research on plant and 
animal genetic resources ought to serve public and small farmers’ needs, rather than 
private interests. However, given the changing nature of IPR, especially in the 
framework of GATT, whereby the US and other northern countries have attempted 
to impose their new rules of TRIPS, which forces all countries to honor northern 
interpretations of patent rights, all measures possible must be taken to secure 
CGIARs’ public goals. If farmers need to be protected from the negative effects of a 
global regime of IPR, then it is the moral obligation of the CGIAR to engage in 
alliances aimed at preventing TNCs, international trade agreements and IPRs from 
destroying agricultural biodiversity and undercutting farmers cultural diversity and 
socioeconomic development Presently, countries are under pressure to change IPR 
laws to conform with the TRIPS agreement of the GAY. Such rules will supersede 
national laws and allow privatization of Third Worlds’ farmers knowledge and 
resources. The ability of companies to gain monopolies over formerly freely 
available genetic resources, including seeds, plants, animals and even micro- 
organisms, may have devastating effects on both, rural communities and the 
protection of agrobiodiversity. The encroachment of IPR in the absence of 
mechanisms that protect small farmers and rural innovators, renders these regimes 
predators or “pirates” of indigenous knowledge and resources. 
Many NGOs and even some governments have expressed concern that 
intellectual property rights for industry, as defined in the TRIPS agreement, will 
prevail over the traditional rights and rights holders recognized in the convention on 
Biological Diversity. Indigenous and local communities, according to the 
biodiversity convention, should share in the benefits derived from the use of their 
knowledge, and have the right to approve and be involved in plans to widen the use 
of then traditional innovations and practices. But the patent system affects the very 
cultural foundations of rural communities by inhibiting farmers from sharing their 
seeds and knowledge with each other. Prohibiting farmers to reuse the seeds yielded 
by their harvests and share their seeds with farmers in other commtmities will 
negatively infhrence local genetic improvement and in-situ conservation. The final 
result will be genetic uniformity and genetic erosion and its serious consequences on 
food security and biodiversity conservation. In addition, the globalisation of plant 
patenting by the Uruguay Round TRIPS agreement will accelerate the rate at which 
market forces already encourage monocultural cropping with genetically uniform 
plant varieties - setting up ideal conditions for outbreaks and the spread of insect 
pests and diseases. 
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The CGIAR should openly endorse the concept of farmers’ rights 
embraced in FAO’s “International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources” which 
recognizes farmer’s contributions to developing biodiversity and to share the 
benefits of their work. Many NGOs advocate of farmer’s rights would hope that the 
CGIAR lobbies negotiators at the FAO so that the revised Undertaking will become a 
protocol of the Convention on Biological Diversity and thus, an integral part of the 
debate over the conflict between the convention and the TRIPS’ agreement 
The CGIAR, NGOs and farmers organizations have a unique opportunity to 
work together to influence the evolution of IPR at the international level and to 
advance informed critiques and propose alternatives to existing IPR concepts and 
laws before 1999. Rural communities, people’s organizations and NGOs around the 
world are making sure that the issues of farmers’ rights, bioprospecting and 
biopiracy, alternatives to E’R and new forms of protection for rural communities and 
life patenting are seriously addressed at national, regional and glolbal fora. If the 
mission of the CGIAR is still to promote food security in developing countries 
through sustainable agriculture, then its historical challenge is to join farmers and 
grassroots organizations in achieving the objectives of: 
. preventing that farming communities are marginalized from the rewards and 
benefits of industrial intellectual property systems; 
achieving recognition for the intellectual integrity and innovation 
systems of rural communities and peoples; 
. developing mechanisms to protect such indigenous intellectual integriiy; 
. implementing farmers’ rights; 
. ensuring that rural and indigenous communities receive compensation for 
their knowledge of plant genetic properties; 
. restricting the right of TNCs to seize and patent resources of 
indigenous peoples; 
. reversing the privatization of biotechnology and challenging the 
direction of currently privately led research. 
It is time for the CGIAR to play a more active role in defining the 
future IPR scenarios so as to prevent that the free exchange of knowledge and 
resources does not give way to a monopoly vested ‘in those who control 
capital and hence the resources for research. The fully developed science of the 
CGIAR of the XXI century must have an agenda determined by the 
needs of the rural people of the developing world. The future of 
biotechnology based research will be determined by power relations, and 
there is no reason why farmers, if sufficiently empowered, could not . 
influence the direction of FR and biotechnology so that it serves their needs. 
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Thammasat Resolution 
THE THAMMASAT RESOLUTION : Building & strengthenin&our suigenmis 
rights 
We, 45 representatives of indigenous, peasant, non-governmental, academic 
and governmental organisations from 19 countries, came together on 1-6 December 
1997 at Thammasat campus just outside Bangkok, Thailand, for an international 
seminar on Sui Generis Rights co-organised by Biothai and GRAIN. We met to study, 
assess and develop our response to the increasing privatisation of biodiversity and 
local knowledge, especially as driven by the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and resulting 
legislation at the regional and national levels. We focused in particular on the sui 
g&mis rights option for intellectual property over plant varieties as imposed on all 
WTO member states by the TRIPS Agreement, as well as on other international 
agreements related to biodiversity such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD..). 
In Thai, ‘Thammasat’ means ‘knowledge of nature’. It also means ‘justice’. The 
name of our venue is central to us. Indigenous peoples, farmers and local 
communities have, over millennia, nurtured and developed the biodiversity on 
which humanity now depends. Wisely using their knowledge of nature to create 
sustainable food and health systems based on sharing their knowledge and 
biodiversity with others. Such community systems are being destroyed by economic 
development under the guise of free trade, Green Revolution agriculture and the 
new biotechnologies, and globalisation. They are also being destroyed by the 
rampant pirating and monopolisation of biodiversity and related knowledge 
through the extension of intellectual property rights (IPR) to life forms. 
Perhaps no country exemplifies our concerns about WTO-enshrined globalisation as 
our host country. At the time we were meeting, Thailand - and much of the rest of 
Southeast and East Asia - is going through a profound crisis resulting from years of 
economic growth founded upon fleeting speculative investment The currency 
tailspin which started last July is accompanied by destabilisation of markets, loss of 
employment and cutting of public spending, and results in a clear loss of control 
over our own economies and livelihoods with the MF taking the steering wheel. 
The WTO TRIPS Agreement obliges developing countries to provide some 
form of IPR on plant varieties by the year 2000. This may be done by patents or by 
some ‘sui generis rights system - meaning, in Latin, a system ‘of its own kind’. In 
1999, one year before implementation, this provision will be reviewed and we are 
preparing ourselves for this review. 
We reaffirm our total and frontal opposition to the extension of intellectual 
property rights to life forms, be it on humans, animals, plants, micro-organisms, or 
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their genes, cells and other parts. We are also decidedly against biopiracy anci the 
monopolisation of biodiversity-related knowledge through such IPRs. 
Our understanding of sui generis rights in TRIPS 
. The overall implication of TRIPS, and for that matter the whole of 
the WTO, is highly detrimental to peoples’ economies, cultures and 
livelihoods. 
The sui generis provision of TRIPS gives WTO member states room to develop 
their own kind of IPR protection for plant varieties, and many nations are 
now changing their national Il?R laws. 
. While some people look at the sui generis option in TRIPS as a window 
through which other forms of rights over biodiversity can be articulated in 
legislation, it is our conviction that such rights will be linked to IPR and will 
result in new and further monopoly rights over plant varieties. 
. The same is true of any sui gmer& rights option which could be developed 
and proposed under the TRIPS Agreements for local and indigenous 
knowledge. 
The reafYirmation of our sui generis rights 
. ‘Sui gmti’ perfectly describes the rights and systems we are struggling to 
defend - our ‘own kind’ of rights and systems. We recognise our sui generis 
rights to exist independently of the IPR-based sui gener& systems promoted 
by the TRIPS Agreement 
. Our rights are inalienable; they existed long before IPR regimes were 
established. As legal, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
they are part of peoples’ sovereignty and therefore part of human rights. 
. As community/collective rights, they are indivisible and 
intergenerational; they include Farmers’ Rights and apply to 
Indigenous Peoples, peasant and family farmers, fisherfolk and other 
local communities which derive their livelihoods from biodiversity. 
. Their place and expression is firstly at the local level, but they must also be 
recognised and guaranteed at the national and international levels. 
. The rights that we are struggling to develop, defend and let flourish 
should never be misinterp&ed as, or denatured into, intellectual property 
rights. 
. Because peoples’ rights are under tremendous threat, we see the promotion of 
such rights also as a tool for resistance against, and the rolling back of, the 
forces of monopoly. 
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It is on this basis that we will actively engage our societies from the village 
level through to our governments in the capitals to take part in the struggle for our 
sui generis rights, and on to the international level to oppose IPR on all forms of life. 
This implies a whole range of information, research, campaign and-coalition 
buildmg activities over the long term. 
Some of the immediate tasks at hand are to: 
. Demand the revision of TRIPS in order to allow for the full exclusion of Il?R 
monopolies over life forms and biodiversity-related knowledge under the 
WTO. 
. Reinforce the defense mechanisms of local communities who are highly 
vulnerable to unbridled bioprospecting and to the introduction of genetically 
engineered organisms. 
Support any calls by local communities for a moratorium on 
bioprospecting, and demand an immediate moratorium on genetically 
engineered organisms. 
Assert the primacy of international agreements on biodiversity, such as the 
CBD and FAO instruments, over TRIPS and other trade regimes, for the 
resolution of these issues. 
Reaffirm the original intent of the CBD for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and prevent the CBD from becoming a 
mechanism for transnational corporations to trade in biodiversity in the name 
of ‘access’ and ‘benefit-sharing’. 
. Mobilise a strong global movement engaging environmental, trade, 
agriculture, consumer, labour; health, food security, women’s, human rights 
and all people’s organisations in these campaigns. 
In the spirit of justice and embracing all knowledge of nature, we 
commit ourselves to the Thammasat Action Plan and invite other 
organisations, movements and peoples to join us in the struggle to 
achieve this vision. 
Bangkok, 5 December 1997 
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Agri-Food Statement 
INTERNATIONAL AGRI-FOOD NETWORK 
Statement on 
Biotechnology and the Agri-Food Industry 
Business organizations, grouped within the International Agri-Food Network (IAFN)*, are the 
driving force behind the technological progress being achieved in the agri-food sector. They thus 
have a major responsibility to ensure that their products meet the highest international standards of 
quality and safety. At the same time they must be open and transparent in their actions, providing 
meaningful inSormation to consumers on their products in any areas of concern. In return business 
expects to be able to operate in a stable environment, regulated by a framework of internationally 
agreed rules based upon recognized scientific and economic principles. 
The roots of biotechnology date back some 12,000 years when women and men learned to select 
the best seeds for planting and to domesticate animals. Modem techniques of genetic improvement 
have allowed the agri-food sector to make spectacular progress. This can be seen in: plant and 
animal breeding, in cheese, beer and bread production, in the preservation of fruits and vegetables, 
and in many other areas. 
Gene transfer technology - modem biotechnology - is a new and important tool for the agri-food 
industry. It allows researchers to transfer directly a desirable gene into an organism that they want 
to improve. Genes can even be introduced from other species, which is not possible with standard 
crossing. Gene transfer technology will allo& researchers to make improvements in plants, animals 
and food products more rapidly, more precisely, and for a broader range of attributes than in the 
Past. 
The potential benefits of this technology are considerable. This potential must be developed 
responsibly to meet the challenges of a growing world population a shrinking natural resource 
base and increasingly demanding consumers. 
Already, this work is showing promise in 
ehminatmg allergy-causing substances in food products e.g. soybeans 
- producing cooking oils with a lower saturated fat content 
- breeding plants with a greater resistance to pests and diseases, and better adaptation to the 
needs of consumers 
developing food products which carry with them precious medicinal qualities. 
The Intemational Agri-Food Network believes that genetically modified organisms are capable of 
bringing real progress in meeting the needs of an ever-growing world population for affordable and 
wholesome foods in an enviromnemally mstamable way. 
At the same time, the International Agri-Food Network is concerned that the products of 
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biotechnology be safe for human health for animals and for the enviromnent. It is essential 
therefore that novel foods, seeds and animals are strictly controlled and rigorously tested, before 
being released onto the market or into the enviromnent. 
The implications of the use of biotechnology are global, so it is at this level that discussion must 
take place and balanced and responsible policy responses found. For it.s~~ the Intemational 
Agri-Food Network will work to promote the following ten actions: 
1. Conservation and access to genetic resources. The International Agri-Food Network supports 
the work to conserve the rich world heritage of genetic resources for the benefit of all 
mankind. 
2. Increased investment in biotecbnoloaical research in order to: 
(i) develop the great promise of genetically modified organisms, and 
(ii) thoroughly understand and master the biological processes involved. - 
3. Rigorous and comurehensive regulatory svstems to ensure the safety of genetically modified 
products. 
4. International harmonization of testing and control nrocedures, based on sound scientific 
principles. Mutual acceptance of food and feed safety standards as “substantially equivalent” 
is necessary to avoid duplication of national approval processes. 
5. Supuort for Codex alimentatius standards, guidelines and recommendations, which <are based 
on internationally - recognized scientific analysis. Codex endorsements are made ‘to ensure 
food quality and the safety of the food supply, and thereby facilitate fair intemational trade. 
6. Labelling of products containing genetically modified material, only where the product is 
signScantly difherent from conventional products. Any form of labelling should not attempt 
to establish a diEerence among products where none exists. 
7. Reasonable time veriod to: 
(i) carry out the necessary administrative procedures and 
(ii) assess the safety of genetically modified organisms. 
8. Protection of intellectual txonertv rights and harmonization at the intematio~d level. 
Biotechnological research for plant and animal breeding, or for the development of new 
products and processes, involves significant investments. Organizations involved in this 
research should be able to receive a reasonable return through the protection of intellectual 
Property. 
9. Fair licensing azzmements. It is important that the results of gene transfer technology benefit 
all partners in the agri-food chain. 
10. Special attention to the needs of the develouin~ countries. Modem :biotechuology has the 
capacity to contribute significantly to world food security. A framework should be established 
to enable the public and private orga&ations concerned to cooperate on an international 
basis, so that the benefits of biotechnology are brought to the traditional plants and animals of 
the developing countries. In this regard, developing countries possess irn immense amount of 
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- 
traditional’knowledge and genetic material which should be recognized. 
* 'DIE INTERNATIONAL AGRI-FOOD NETWORK (IAFN) fosters coop-eration and 
understanding among international agri-food sector organizations, and takes joint 
action on items of common interest. 
ASSINSEL - International Association of Plant Breeders 
CIAA- Confederation des Industries Agro-Alimentaires de I’UE 
CQMISA - Confederation Mondiale de 1’Industrie de la SantC &male 
FIS - International Seed Trade Federation 
GCPF - Global Crop Protection Federation 
ICA - International Co-operative Alliance 
ICC - International Chamber of Commerce 
IFA - International Fertilizer Industry Association 
IFAP- International Federation of Agricultural Producers 
IMS- International Meat Secretariat 


































LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Baciih fhuringiensis 
Convention on biological diversity 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research 
Commission on genetic resources for agriculture 
Centro Intemacional de Agricultura Tropical 
(Colombia) 
Centro Intrenacional de Mejoramiento de Mais y Trigo 
(International Maiz and Wheat Improvement Centre, - 
Mexico) 
Centro Intemacional de la Papa (International Potato 
Centre, Peru) 
Conference of the Parties 
Food and Agriculture Organisation 
General Agreement on Tar-i& and Trade 
Genetically modsed organism 
International agricultural research center 
International Centre for Agricultural Research in the 
Dry Areas (Syria) 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics (India) 
International Centers Week 
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (Nigeria) 
International Network for the Improvement of Banana 
and Plantain (France, part of IPGRI) 
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (Italy) 
Intellectual property protection 
Intellectual property right 
International Rice Research Institute (I%ilippines) 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri- 
Biotech Applications 
International Service for National Agricultural 
(Netherlands) 
Materials transfer agreement 
National agricultural research system(s) 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
Non-govemmental organisation 
Organ&ion for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
Plant genetic resources 
Research and development 
Technical Advisory Committee to the CGIAR 
Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 





Union pour la Protection des Obtentions V&g&ales 
(International Union for the Protection on New 
Varieties of Plants) 
West African Rice Development hsocitition (Cote 
d’Ivoire) 
World Intellectual Property Organizatidn 
World Trade Organization 
Centres in italics are part of the CGIAR 
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